1.1 Background of the Three Gorges Project
The Yangtze River, or the Changjiang (Long River, as the Chinese call it) is the longest river in China and the third longest in the world, with a mainstream length of more than 6300 kilometers, next only to the Amazon and the Nile, and the third largest in terms of annual runoff after the Amazon and the Congo Rivers (Partow, 2011). Originating from the Tuotuo River in the Eastern Highlands which rise 6100 meters high to the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, the Yangtze River flows through southwest, central and eastern China, crossing seven provinces, two municipalities and two of China’s autonomous regions (CTGPC, 2008). The flow of the Yangtze continues eastward into the East China Sea near Shanghai, the largest city in China with approximately 19 million inhabitants (Shanghai Government, 2009).
Prior to the construction of the Three Gorges Dam, the Yangtze River Basin covered an area of 1.8 million square kilometers, about one fifth of China’s total territory, within which nearly one third of China’s enormous population of 1.4 billion people originally inhabited (Lu, 1996; Fu et al., 2003; Hao, 2003; CTGPC, 2008). The Basin has long been regarded as the birthplace of the ancient civilization of China, while the Yangtze River has been revered by many as the lifeblood river nourishing China’s socio-economic development. Unsurprisingly, China’s largest industrial and agricultural areas are located along the river. It is estimated that 80 percent of the river basin is suitable for community living and productive activities, thus ensuring that the Yangtze River Basin would become one of China’s most commercially prominent and lucrative economic zones (CTGPC, 2008). Statistics confirm that the Yangtze River Basin contributes approximately 40 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), 35 percent of the nation’s total grain production and 31 percent of its forest area (Barber & Ryder, 1993; Lu, 1996; Hao, 2003; Fu et al., 2003; CTGPC, 2008). The Yangtze River affords navigable boat and ship travel of more than 2800 kilometers and has proven itself to be China’s major trade route for more than two millennia. Since China’s reform in the beginning of 1980’s, and proactive program of international trade with the western world, the Yangtze River Basin has played a salient part in the advancement of China’s monumental goal to achieve sustainable socio-economic development (Gleick, 2008; CWRC, 2010).
The Yangtze is alive with myriad tributaries which weave their way through adjacent land along virtually the whole stretch of the Yangtze River Basin, providing an estimated 35 percent of China’s freshwater resources, and 60 percent of economically exploitable hydropower potential (CTGPC, 2008). The average discharge of the Yangtze River is approximately 32,500 cubic meters per second, while the water head difference (the difference between the upper and lower reach of the river) along the river is up to 5400 meters, a clear indication of its tremendous potential for generating an almost incredible hydropower output. Its potential power capacity, for example, is estimated to be 277,808 million watts, of which 256,270 million watts is technologically exploitable. Its estimated potential annual power output is 1.1879 trillion kilowatts per hour, equivalent to 40 percent, 48 percent and 49 percent respectively of those of the nation’s totals (Jones & Freeman, 2001; CWRC, 2010).
The water resources in the Yangtze River however are unevenly distributed along the river, with significant variations annually. In the flood season, the ‘spatio-temporal distribution of water’ as it is called, is discrepant. The seasonal flood water-flow is extraordinary, without a doubt, but it does not flood uniformly (CWRC, 2010). While some areas are ideally suited to accommodate the rains, other areas such as the middle and lower reaches provide limited water accommodations. This is one reason that China’s infamous and horrendous floods can occur spontaneously (ibid).
Figure 1-1: Qutang – the first of the Yangtze River’s three gorges (Source: MyWiseWife.com)
Figure 1-2: The Wu Gorge – the second of the Yangtze River’s three gorges (Source: MyWiseWife.com)
Figure 1-3: The Xiling Gorge – the third of the Yangtze River’s three gorges (Source: MyWiseWife.com)
Flooding
There is no question whatsoever that over the past 2000 years the Yangtze’s mighty floods have been the cause of enormous destruction and the loss of millions of lives, especially amongst dense populations of people residing in the midstream and downstream areas (CWRC, 2010). Various records of flooding over the course of more than 2200 years, (from the beginning of the Han Dynasty to the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911) reveal that there have been at least 210 floods. That represents an average of one flood every 10 years. In the last century, extremely severe flooding occurred in 1931, 1935, 1954 and 1998 (CWRC, 2010). These floods claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and mammoth losses to agricultural and food storage; as well as to homes, property and livestock (Jackson & Sleigh, 2000; Yin & Li, 2001; Tullos, 2008; CWRC, 2010).
Amazing Flora and Fauna
The Yangtze River Basin is home to myriad plant species, supporting two thirds of China’s 3,980 genuses and approximately half of China’s 30,000 spermatophytes (CWRC, 2010). The Basin is also reckoned to be China’s ‘treasure house’ of endangered and rare aquatic species. According to expert estimates, some 1,100 kinds of aquatic species exist and thrive in the Yangtze River system. More than 416 fish species have been identified, 9 species of which are listed among the rarest in the world and thus allegedly protected with diligence by the State (Zhu, 1995; Ye et al., 2008). The Yangtze River has certainly established an international reputation for its importance in manifest biodiversity and well-justified program of wetland protection. There is no other river in China that can offer as much richness in biodiversity (Fu, et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2007).
The Archaeological Significance of the Three Gorges Dam
Prior to the dam construction, the Three Gorges area was proudly proclaimed as one of the world’s richest archeological locations. The Three Gorges and its surrounding environment are abundant with multifarious historical and cultural relics from different dynasties, some of which can be traced back 5000 years ago to the New Stone Age (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). One of the most famous and renowned of archaeological unearthing revealed the ancient culture of Ba-Chu, abundant with archeological treasure of all kinds, proudly displaying the most advanced agricultural skills of that time (CWRC, 2010).
Logistics of the Three Gorges Project and Its Rationale
Given China’s political predilection for ‘modernism’, the perceived need for dramatically increased dependence on hydroelectric power was perhaps ineluctable. Coupled with government concerns about flood control, the Three Gorges Dam grew from an idea to a reality.
As we saw earlier, the Three Gorges Dam Project (often abbreviated as TGDP) is recognized as being the biggest hydraulic project in China, as well as in the world, the final construction of the Three Gorges Dam has left China and the world with a monumental structure. The highest reservoir water level is 175 meters, with a total holding capacity of 39.3 billion cubic meters (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). The dam area is 660 kilometers long, with an average width of 1.1 kilometers, and a reservoir area 1084 square kilometers (CTGPC, 2002; Highland, 2008; Guo, 2010). As a multipurpose project, its socio-political justification derived mainly from its potential contribution to the development of the Yangtze Delta for the management of flood control, along with its alleged environmentally friendly and truly enormous capacity for power generation, as well as more efficient and improved navigation.
Figure 1-4: Map of the Three Gorges Dam (Source: www.irn.org/programs/threeg/map.shtml, 2004)
The dam is located in the area of Xiling Gorge, one of the three gorges of the river, which manages a drainage area of 1 million square kilometers, with an average annual runoff of 451 billion cubic meters of water and a sediment discharge of 530 million tons (CTGPC, 2002). The river is wider at the dam site, which is located on the Gorge’s extensive granite base, forming an excellent bedrock base for the reservoir of the dam. Advocates of the dam regard this dense granite base as an extremely favorable endemic geological condition for dam construction (CIPM, 1989).
The idea of building such a humongous dam in the Three Gorges area had been conceived as early as 1913 by the different leaders at different periods in recent Chinese history. The original idea for the dam antedated the communist regime. It is widely accepted that the first formal proposal for the dam was advanced by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, known by many as the founding ‘father of modern China’ (Dai, 1994; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006; Gleick, 2008). It was he who initiated the idea of constructing a dam to facilitate shipping along the channel from Yichang up to Chongqing, the metropolitan city, located along the middle region of the Yangtze’s flow. In his book Strategy for State, Part II: “Industrial Plans”, published in 1918, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen put forward his scheme to ‘improve the upstream from here’ by “use of a lock to block the river to let boats move against the water as well as make use of water resources” (People.com.cn, 2008). Later in August of 1924 in Guangzhou, in a speech titled “Third Principle of the People, Peoples’ Livelihood” (ibid), he further elaborated the potential hydropower resources that the River holds to compensate for the shortage of electricity production. “If the water power in the Yangtze …could be utilized by the newest methods to generate electrical power, in his speech He said, “if we could utilize the water power in the Yangtze…to generate one hundred million horsepower of electrical energy, … we shall have enough power to supply railways, motor cares, fertilizer factories, and all kinds of manufacturing establishment” (Chetham, 2002, p. 117).
He was of the professional view that the area of the Three Gorges was the most suitable spot for building a dam large enough to generate the electricity requirements for the modernization of China (Highland, 2008). Although Sun’s ambitious idea was received enthusiastically by some (Dai, 1994), the advent of World War I (1914-1918) gave rise within China to a whole host of political, socio-cultural and economic problems, each of which in its own peculiar way shifted ‘priority spending’ away from the monumental Three Gorges Dam construction (Dai, 1994; People.com.cn, 2008; CTGPC, 2008).
During the 1930s, under the aegis of the Construction Committee of the Nationalist Party Government, a party founded by Dr. Sun, a survey was organized and undertaken by a prospecting team to check the feasibility of building a large dam for the primary purpose of hydroelectric power generation in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River (Dai, 1994; People.com.cn, 2008). Two possible dam sites, Huanglingmiao and Gezhouba in Xiling Gorge, were recommended after examining a few alternative plans. However, this Hydroelectric Generating Plan equipped with shiplocks for navigation, was simply filed away for reference and not implemented (Jones & Freeman, 2001; Chetham, 2002; People.com.cn, 2008).
In 1944, Nationalist party leader, Chiang Kai-shek, anxious to consolidate his diminishing support, and at the same time under pressure to undertake a political and economic reform, decided to revive and reconsider Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s developmental scheme as part of an overall postwar construction plan (Chetham, 2002). In May 1944, Dr. John Lucian Savage, a leading dam builder, who worked on most of the TVA dams as well as the great Boulder (Hoover) Dam in Nevada and Arizona, became involved in the Chinese deliberations (Jones & Freeman, 2001). He was then the chief designing engineer of the US Bureau of Reclamation, and was soon invited by the Nanjing Government Resources Commission, to investigate the viability of the proposal that a major dam be built in the Three Gorges area (ibid). It was Dr. Savage who catalyzed the report known as the Yangtze River Project: “Development Plans of Three Gorges” (ibid). A number of other possible dam sites located downstream from the present Three Gorges Dam were recommended in this Plan (Jones & Freeman, 2001; Chetham, 2002).
The ‘Plan’, as it became known within the engineering profession, also suggested that given the local topography, the ‘drop height’ of the dam could be up to 225 meters, with a water level of 200 meters, thus ensuring a total amount of hydropower capacity of 10560 million watts. Moreover, the ship lock in this Plan was designed to enable thousands of ships to sail up to the metropolis of Chongqing, with additional locks strategically placed to assist flood control function (People.com.cn, 2008). The total investment of constructing such a dam was approximately 9.35 billion US dollars in 1944. The Plan was regarded by many hydraulic engineers as the most sophisticated plan yet produced to maximize multi-purpose water utilization (Jones & Freeman, 2001).
In May 1945, a water resources committee was formed and called the “Three Gorges Hydropower Plan and Technical Research Committee” (ibid). In August of the same year, an investigatory and feasibility section was established under the authority of the Hydropower Project (People.com.cn, 2008), with the ostensible goal of determining how the Plan could most efficiently and economically be implemented.
In May 1946, just one month after Dr. Savage’s‘re-investigated’ the three Gorges area, the Committee signed a technical corporation protocol committing the design task to the US Bureau of Reclamation (Jones & Freeman, 2001). Following this protocol, 54 Chinese technical personnel were sent to the US to participate in an educational program on hydraulic design and research. Unfortunately in 1947, the nationalist government was obliged to terminate all planning and work on the Project due to the deep economic crisis and highly disruptive Chinese Civil War then confronting China (Dai, 1998; Allin, 2004; Guo, 2010).
By the early 1950’s, sufficient political stabilization had occurred to establish Changjiang (Yangtze River/ Long River) Water Resource Committee (the Yangtze Valley Planning Office, CWRC) in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province (Jones & Freeman, 2001). This organization was commissioned to work directly under the Ministry of Water Resources and was established by the recently founded Communist Government for the comprehensive management of the Yangtze River. In 1955, following the catastrophic Yangtze River flood in 1954, which caused in excess of 30,000 deaths, a comprehensive program of flood control planning was initiated by the Ministry of Water Resources, to be implemented by the Yangtze Valley Planning Office (Dai, 1994; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). Thus began yet another systematic investigation of the Yangtze River drainage area which might affect the design and planning of the Three Gorges Dam (Dai, 1994; Barber& Ryder, 1993; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006; Gleick, 2008).
In 1956, the head of Yangtze Valley Planning Office, Lin Yishan, suggested a plan for building a 250-meters-high dam with a ‘multiple-use’ design for the production of hydroelectric power and flood management of the Yangtze River (; Dai, 1994; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). In 1956-1958, almost 10,000 scientific personnel from more than 200 working groups joined this nationwide effort to assess the issues (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). A number of the major technical issues associated with the project included in the proposal and were partially resolved by providing scientific evidence for the preliminary technical design. It is worth noting that the “Report on the Main Points of the Preliminary Design” issued by the Yangtze Valley Planning Office was based on technical, but not environmentally well-informed research (ibid). In the light of this technical engineering research, report and after considerable discussion by experts representing the planning groups alluded to above, Sandouping was unanimously chosen to be the best location for the dam (ibid).
In 1958, Chairman Mao made public his view that it was imperative for China to have the largest hydroelectric dam in the world (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). He famously swam the Yangtze’s width and composed an ode to a dam. “Great plans are afoot… Walls of stone that will stand upstream to the west… The mountain goddess if she is still there. Will marvel at a world so changed” (Mao, 1956). With so strong a political vindication of the Three Gorges Dam Project, the persistent debate and criticism of the dam construction were, according to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, decidedly discouraged, if not implicitly suppressed (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Dai, 1998; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006).
By 1959, preparation work for the Yangtze dam project was underway, but political momentum for the project stopped abruptly in 1960, due to the impending onset of a severe economic depression resulting from the overzealous financial optimism advertised in a propaganda campaign, which exaggerated the actual stage of China’s economic development (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). Known as ‘The Great Leap Forward’[1], the campaign, which was intended to foster confidence in China’s economy, collapsed disastrously through public realization that the campaign was more propaganda than fact (Beattie, 2002; International Rivers Network, 2003a; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006).
By 1963, however, interest in resuscitating the TGDP again emerged, this time in large part because new political policies incorporated a governmental investment scheme for building what was called a ‘Third Front’ of industry development in the southwest area of China (International Rivers Network, 2003a; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). Despite this new attitude of optimism, progress on the dam project was once again short-lived with the advent of the Cultural Revolution which erupted in 1966 (ibid). It is well-established that during this period a number of China’s political relationships were strengthened, while others were weakened and even dissolved. Once a close ally of China, for example, the former Soviet Union had by 1969 become so alienated from China that the Chinese government delayed further construction of the dam, due to the growing fear that the Soviet Union was very likely to sabotage the project upon its completion (Sutton, 2004).
In 26 December 1970, what became known as the ‘Gezhouba Dam project’[2], served as a compromise plan, and was advanced for implementation by the then Chinese leadership. The alternative dam was approved for construction, and although it began producing electricity in 1981, it was not totally completed until 1989 (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). The GezhoubaDam is 70 meters high and 2600 meters long with an annual output of electricity of 15.7 billion Kilowatts per hour (ibid). Communist leaders heralded the success of the dam as a vindication of the proposed rationale for constructing the largest dam in the world, the Three Gorges Dam (Wahby, 2004; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). None the less, the way forward was still unclear (Barber & Ryder, 1993; Jones & Freeman, 2001; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006).
In 1978, new economic reforms were introduced which strongly admonished that China’s rapidly developing industrial base would be impeded without sufficient energy. In 1979, political interest in the Three Gorges Dam was reinforced by renewed pledges of investment and international confidence in China’s massive economic potential. This new wave of foreign investment provided the type of assurances needed for the Chinese State Council to formalize the allocation of funding and the recommencement of construction on the dam. Given State Council’s renewed and undaunted commitment to completing the Yangtze dam project, it is perhaps not surprising that critics were quick to remind those who would listen that State approval for the resumption of the dam construction was activated even before a reliable feasibility study had been conducted (International Rivers Network, 2003a).
In March 1980, however, the United States and China signed a “Protocol on Cooperation in Hydroelectric Power and Related Water Resource Management”. Under the Protocol, a one-year period of training for 11 Chinese engineers and another 30-days program for 10 engineers was provided — a far cry from what the dam-builder John Savage had proposed was necessary in the 1940s (Barber& Ryder, 1993). None the less, this revitalization of U.S./China relations and partnership projects brought together the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the TVA, with the explicit aim to bring the TGDP to fruition (Jones & Freeman, 2001). Despite this liaison, the U.S. government’s original support for the project transferred to American private enterprise, inasmuch as the radical environmentalist bent of the Carter Administration prevented any major U.S. direct government involvement in the Three Gorges Project (ibid). In February 1982, Qian Zhengying, the former minister of the Water Conservancy Department communicated to the public instructions from the central government that the Three Gorges Project should be listed in the National Development Plan (Dai, 1994; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006).
In 1982-1983, a feasibility study conducted by the Yangtze Valley Planning Office recommended that a 175-meters-high dam be built with a reservoir level of 150 meters (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). The dam was scheduled for construction at a time to be determined in 1986 (ibid). Again, protests and criticisms from both academic and environmentalist groups admonished that if the dam were built, catastrophic environmental consequences would follow (Dai, 1994). Amidst the controversy, some governmental bodies, such as the Ministry of Communications and the Municipality of Chongqing, suggested that there would be advantages in raising the reservoir level from from 150 to 180 meters (Barber & Ryder, 1993; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). Whether the proposal was intended to delay the proceeding is speculation, but inasmuch as it was agreed that a feasibility study should be initiated to analyze the proposal, there was indeed a further delay in the project approval (ibid). Complicating matters further, a report based on a 38-days field trip to the dam site in 1986, conducted by the delegation of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC), concluded that many technical engineering and environmental problems still needed to be addressed, thus urging that construction of the dam should be postponed until more detailed studies became available to make more informed decision (Barber & Ryder, 1993; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006).
By the mid-eighties persistent debate on the overall integrity of the initial feasibility study led leaders from the city of Chongqing to request that a new feasibility study be conducted in 1986 (Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). The hope was that this new study might more accurately reflect the international standards of reliability needed to assess the deeper environmental and humanitarian issues associated, both with the immediate construction of the dam and its ongoing actual functioning (ibid). It was to be hoped also that this new feasibility study might also be used to approve the request by leaders of Chongqing that the height of the dam should be raised substantially. Given the official endorsement of yet another feasibility study and the fact that official approval for the construction of the dam had already been given, considerable political pressure was soon placed on professionals involved in the project to sign off in its favor, despite recalcitrant and lingering doubts in the minds of some that far too many questions still remained unanswered (ibid).
From February to March 1989, the Leading Group for Three Gorges Project Argumentation reviewed and approved the revised Feasibility Report of the Three Gorges Dam construction, reaffirming that a storage level of 175 meters should be ideal (Dai, 1998). Given that a second agreement was signed in 1992 by China and the U.S. which agreed to provide technical assistance on data collection and management, software support, drill-hole survey technology, and dam safety monitoring (Jones & Freeman, 2011), it was clear that the power-brokers of vested interest had joined forces. Despite the humanitarian protests against the construction of the Three Gorges Dam and a strong U.S. environmentalist movement to sabotage all U.S. involvement in the TGP (ibid), the promise of U.S. funding and technical support with direct involvement in the project proved to be irresistible.
March 16, 1992, the then Premier Minister, Li Peng, submitted a report vindicating the decision to commence building the Three Gorges Dam without further delay, affirming the importance and urgency of its construction, its technical feasibility and economic rationale (Barber & Ryder, 1993; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). On 21 March 1992, the Deputy Premier Minister, Zou Jiahua, then announced that the construction report for the Three Gorges Project had been completed. It included seven parts: 1) Main Evaluation Procedures of the Three Gorges Project; 2) Significance of the Three Gorges Project; 3) Construction Plan of the Three Gorges Project; 4) Technical Feasibility of the Three Gorges Project; 5) Feasibility of Fundraising for the Three Gorges Project; 6) Issues of Resettlement, Environment and National Defense; 7) Suggestions on Management and Decision-making for the Three Gorges Project (CTGPC, 2008). On 3 April 1992, the approval Resolution to the Three Gorges Project was adopted at the fifth meeting of the Seventh People’s Congress, indicating that the Project approval would automatically enter into the executive process from the legislative process. The Three Gorges Project protocol was ratified by a vote of 1767 to 177, with 664 abstentions and 25 invalid votes. Votes in favor accounted for 67.1 percent, which is over the half of number of all representatives (Barber & Ryder, 1993; Dai, 1998; Ponseti & López-Pujol, 2006). It meant that after nearly 40 years planning, researching and debate, a fundamentally controversial proposal for the largest hydroelectric in the history of China and in the world history was being implemented.
On 3 January 1993, the State Council TGP Construction Committee was founded; it was constituted so as to have an executive office, a migrant relocation development bureau, and the future China Yangtze Three Gorges Development Corporation (CTGPC, 2002). On 2 April 1993, the State Council Three Gorges Project Construction Committee defined the project management system and financing sources, while also approving at their very first meeting the Regulations for the Three Gorges Project Migrant Relocation Plan, which would monitor and regulate all relevant dislocation schemes (CTGPC, 2008a). Later on 29 July 1993, the State Council TGP Construction Committee approved the Report of Preliminary Design of the TGP forwarded by the Yangtze River Water Resource Commission at the second committee meeting, ensuring that the project had now entered into the overall preparation stage for construction (ibid).
[1] The Great Leap Forward’ was an ambitious economic and social campaign initiated by Chairman Mao Zedong from 1958 to 1961) aimed to rapidly transform China from an agricultural economy into a modern communist society through the process of rapid industrialization and collectivization. This ideological campaign caused a massive environmental degradation and a huge famine that resulted in the death toll range from 18 million to 45 million ( Dikötter, 2010; Gráda,2011).
[2] The Gezhouba Dam, located on the Yangtze River, about 40 kilometers downstream from the Three Gorges Dam, was constructed from 1970 to 1988 with a total installed electrical capacity of 2,715MW.
[3] Defined by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) as a large dam is at least 15 meters high from foundation to crest. Dams between 5 to 15 meters may also be considered ‘large dams’ if they meet the following requirements: crest length of over 500 meters, reservoir capacity of at least 1 million m3, and maximum flood discharge of 2,000 cubic meters per second (McCully, 2001; Namy, 2007).
[4] YWRP: Yangtze River Valley Water Resources Protection Bureau
[5] It has been suggested by couple recent studies that the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from coal fired power plants would be counteracted by the emission of GHG through the use of fossil fuels during the dam construction and the decay of organic matter (plants, algeae,etc.) within the reservoir continuing to release CO2. Therefore the argument begins to weaken.