2.2 The Controversy of Large Dam Building
The enormous investments and widespread impacts of large dams have seen conflicts flare up over the sitting and impacts of large dams – both those in place and those on the drawing board, making large dams one of the most hotly contested issues in sustainable development today (WCD overview, 2001.p.6)
Hydropower, irrigation, water supply and flood control services were widely seen as sufficient justification for the huge investments required; while other benefits, such as the economic prosperity brought to a region by multiple cropping, the installation of electricity in rural areas, and the expansion of physical and social infrastructures, such as roads and schools, were used to justify dams as the most economically and financially competitive option. However, a growing body of knowledge and experience about the performance and consequences of large dams has raised questions about the reported returns on the investments required, and the level and distribution of benefits actually delivered (WCD overview, 2001, p.7).
When the construction of large dams peaked from the 1930s to the 1970s, they were regarded by many as a symbol of, if not synonymous with, development and economic progress. For example, the Indian former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru once referred to dams as the new ‘temples of modern India’. Since the 1950s, as the Chinese national economy expanded, along with its population, dams have been promoted by proponents as a long-term, integral part of social and economic development strategies, and as the primary way in which the indispensable range of water and energy needs such as electricity, flood control, irrigation and water supply could best be met. As we observed in the previous chapter, dams have been praised for their ability to deliver multiple benefits in addition to water provision. Their potential role in flood control and water management has strongly been prompted, and the most self-explanatory benefit from dams is their capacity to generate allegedly an economically ‘least-cost’ source of electric hydropower. This in turn is believed to lead directly to regional development, job creation and, the creation of a nationwide industrial base, while other goals include “the generation of income from export earnings, either through direct sales of electricity or by selling cash crops” and “processed products from electricity-intensive industries” (WCD overview, 2001, p.2).
However, the developmental role of large dams has become controversial, and the benefits need to be weighed up against the wide range of adverse social and related environmental costs associated with large dams. These costs include their virtually inevitable budgetary overruns, unexpected geological impediments, and various unanticipated economic and negative externalities. In one way or another disconcerting episodes related to these large dam-induced negativities have become increasingly obvious over the last fifty years (Dorcey et al. 1997; WCD overview, 2001), especially for a number of professionals in the field, including the author of this thesis, who has worked as a hydraulic engineer and project manager in the field, and who has recently got the chance to reflect philosophically on the quality of their work. The continuum of discourse within which “large dams” debate which unfolds is often highly polarized, ranging from at one end, the “gap between the promised benefits of a dam and the actual outcomes” of its construction and deployment, to the “challenges of developing water and energy in terms of ‘nation building’ and ‘resource allocation’ provision at the other (WCD overview, 2001, p.4). The debate is partly about what happened in the past and what is continuing to happen today, and thus partly about what globally is likely to unwrap in the future if more large dams are built (WWF, 2003). The intensifying controversy surrounding large dams is not only about the technical issues of the construction integrity of the dam, but about a wide range of environmental and humanitarian concerns, and their ramifications in terms of social justice and environmental degradation. As decision-making processes in many countries have become more open and transparent, the future of large-scale dams is increasingly being called into question. Displacement and impoverishment of people, destruction of unique ecosystems and fishery resources in particular, debt burden, combined with cost overruns, and the inequitable bearing of costs and sharing of benefits, are particularly the talking points of those who protest against the construction of large dams. Rivers have been fragmented, and people (an estimated to be up to 80 million worldwide) have been displaced by dam construction (WCD overview, 2001). In addition, the vast amount of investment and material required to build large dams, and to sustain or mitigate their huge socio-cultural, environmental and economic impacts, have undoubtedly fuelled opposition to large dam projects (Webber, 2011).
Given this evolving consciousness of environmental awareness, and the realization of the increased violation of the human rights of politically weak or ‘disempowered’ groups such as ethnic minorities and indigenous people affected by the resettlement planning of big dams, a comprehensive reassessment of ‘gigantism’ and ‘techno-hubris’ has begun since the early 1990s (McCormack, 2001, p.6). Philosophical questions about whether a particular dam could justifiably be regarded as the most suitable options to meet particular development needs became of central importance. Initially arising from debate focusing on specific dam sites, opposition has now evolved into a global debate about the dominant models of ‘mega-dam’ development and their negative impact on communities, lost livelihoods of many, social injustice, and the destruction of vital ecosystems. There is also considerable debate whether mega-dams represent the best use of public funds and resources (McCully, 2001). Well before the Three Gorges Dam was constructed, the world was awakened to a new environmental paradigm of co-operative sustainability. Indeed, after the Rio Conference of 1992, the critical importance of ‘environmental stewardship’ and ‘sustainability’ began to emerge as a fundamental principle to define appropriate decision making, for a maturing global civil society (McCormack, 2001). The concept of large dams thus came to be recognized as being based on a “flawed, outdated, and mistaken technology” (McCormack, 2001, p.6). The fascination for mega-dams has gradually been disappeared in view of their deleterious effects, thus making the decision to build the Three Gorges Dam all the more surprising. The consensus based on evolving scientific and public-opinion today is that they should no longer be built (ibid). As a result, some environmentally mindful national governments, and international funding organizations such as the World Bank, have significantly decreased their support for, and even ceased the provision of funds to developing nations for large dam construction (WCD, 2000). In addition, the process of demolition of such dams has already begun in some developed countries. By the end of the twentieth century, nearly 500 dams had already been demolished, including 27 large dams, based on reasons of safety, economics, and especially environmental and equity issues (McCully, 2001, lxi-xii). Despite the availability of the evidence against building mega-dams of China, the largest dam in the world was being built in the flood plains despite the substantive evidence adduced against it (WCD, 2000; McCormack, 2001).
Paradoxically, the decline of large-scale dam construction in the western world in the last decade signaled a frenzy of major dam building efforts in the developing world especially in China and India. Dam construction technology had been portrayed by the Third World countries as a form of ‘environmental and social triage’, a source of renewable, carbon-free energy and as an essential dimension of economic growth without regard for the rights of local populations, the preservation of ecosystems and the economic and socio-cultural costs it involved (WCD, 2000). For example, China is currently planning and continuing the construction of new mega-dams in the Yangtze River, despite the grave concerns expressed about the construction of large-scale dams since the completion of the massive TGDP (Jackson & Sleigh, 2000; McCormack, 2001; Lewis, 2013). None the less, during the period of planning for the Three Gorges Dam and beyond, debate proceed on issues of equity, justice, governance, and power (Bird, 2006). Politically, the Chinese rationale for big dams like the Three Gorges Dam has been socially reiterated as symbols of global power and economic success. Given the evidence weighed against them they could just as easily have become “symbols of the destruction of the natural world and of the corruption and arrogance of over-powerful land service corporations, bureaucracies and governments” (McCully, 2001, p. 282).
2.2.1 Three Gorges Project – The Most Controversial Project in the World
Let me summarize briefly the evolution of the debate surrounding the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. The thesis argument thus far has made clear that the TGDP has been a center of controversy and turmoil from its inception to its completion and up to the present. We have considered the debate inside and outside of China, and even within the Communist party. Although it has provoked opposition for social equity, environmental and economic reasons, one of the main reasons for opposition worldwide to the Three Gorges Project was due to the forced eviction of huge numbers of people (1.3 million according to the Chinese official figure) from their homes and farmlands. This huge population of people was, in some cases, given hardly any notice; they were literally wrenched from their homes with what they could carry, to make way for the reservoir areas created by the dam. One of the other burning issues relates to the deleterious environmental effects of the dam. The TGDP “promises to bring clean, renewable energy to a country whose air is among the most polluted in the world. At the same time, it threatens rare wildlife, ancient monuments and the natural environment it tries to reshape” (ENGR, p.2). For example, it was also revealed that the Three Gorges Dam was contributing to climate change, since rotting vegetation often gathers behind the dam, emitting greenhouse gases [EPA (U.S.), 2009]. This is just one example amongst many of the unanticipated environmental consequences caused by huge dams, and the TGDP, in particular.
Throughout the protracted debate over the Three Gorges Dam, numerous objections and challenges to the project have been mounted by environmentalists, social scientists, geologists, sedimentation experts, hydraulic power engineers, military planners and other Chinese specialists concerned about the dam’s likely economic, social, political and national security consequences. These protests have received short shrift from top government leaders, in particular from Premier Li Peng, who seemed as intent about denying a public forum to opponents of the monumental project, as he was on forcing its plan through, both as a means of symbolizing China’s fast-emerging ‘superpower’ status, and as a vehicle for personal glorification. Since 1956, two generations of Three Gorges Dam opponents from Li Rui, formerly Mao Zedong’s personal secretary and Vice-Minister of Water Resources, to Dai Qing, a former Guangming Daily journalist who in February 1989 published an anthology of articles opposing the dam, have both been discriminated against, dismissed from office, publicly humiliated, branded as ‘rightists’ and on certain occasions sent to prison for their dissenting views. Yet it is often critical voices such as theirs which were most urgently needed at the height of the debate, but were forcibly made inaudible by government oppression. It is voices such as these that are needed to give a vision of integrity which the rapid ideological plan of modernization on which China embarked did not have (Liebarthal & Oksenberg, 1988; Dai, 1994&1998)
Symbol of China’s Greatness
Despite the persistent presumption on the part of many countries and people that large dams should be considered as one of the development impellers for a nation, not only by ‘more efficiently’ meeting water, transportation and energy needs, but also by serving as generators of employment for the masses I submit that the decision to build the dam was driven primarily by China’s preoccupation with patriotic pride, superpower status and national prestige, manifest in the goal of global ascendancy that when all was said, demanded that the decision to construct this largest dam in the world be pushed through, no matter what the cost. As a consequence, the large body of evidence and professional criticism that had accumulated against it was, even when paid ‘lip-service’ contemptuously ignored. Virtually no matter how much criticism was made or how many protests took place, or how much money was required, the decision to build the Three Gorges Dam was actually a matter of political agenda, based upon China’s obsession with political superpower status and economic dominance (Topping, 1998; WCD, 2000; McCully, 2001; Oliver-Smith, 2010).
Given the covert presumptions underpinning the Chinese national agenda, it should by now be clear that the construction of the Three Gorges Dam has been motivated in large part politically as a propaganda symbol of China’s contemporary greatness and its glorious passages to modernity, economic progress, national success, thus elevating the nation’s competitiveness and full participation in international trade and economic systems (WCD, 2000; McCormack, 2001). This symbolization embodies “the aggressive, activist spirit of modern society, subduing and harnessing natural forces, allegedly, for the ‘greater good’” (Oliver-Smith, 2010, p.35). The goal of political supremacy was summarized by the shibboleth, ‘four modernizations’, under former Premier Minister of the period of Cultural Revolution Zhou Enlai and elaborated by Deng Xiaoping[1] in 1978. The idea was that China’s future as a developed country depended upon embracing industry, agriculture, military organization and education (Topping, 1998). The application of science and engineering into the megaprojects is interpreted as symbolic of the might of the modern state which ‘released’ humanity from a life that used to be ruled by nature and superstition. What we really see is the joint illusion of rationality and science taking a back seat to a dogmatic political agenda designed to erect the Three Gorges Dam as a monument to China’s hardline regime ((McCully, 2001; Oliver-Smith, 2010). In a speech at the damming ceremony, former President Jiang Zemin had this to say:
“(The Dam) embodies the great industrious and dauntless spirit of the Chinese nation and displays the daring vision of the Chinese people for new horizons and better future in the course of their reform and opening-up.” (Living On Earth Three Gorges Dam, p.1)
And former Prime Minister Li Peng, a former Soviet Union trained hydraulic engineer said enthusiastically:
“’It will demonstrate to the world that the Chinese people have the ability to build the biggest and the most beneficial irrigation and hydroelectric project in the world at present,”… “It is an event that not only inspires people, but demonstrates the greatness of the achievement of China’s development.” (Chan, 1997)
The Suppression of Opponents
The proposal of building the TGD raised broad protests among environmentalists, scientists, archaeologists, intellectuals and journalists, which led to the decision of the suspension of the construction of the Three Gorges Project made by the National People’s Congress under the pressure of 272 delegates during the spring 1989 session (Barber & Ryder, 1993). However, after the demonstration of June 1989 in Tiananmen Square, the voices of protest against the Three Gorges Project were silenced by branding opponents disloyal or unpatriotic, both of which were potentially threats to their safety. This is when Dai Qing, the author of anti-dam publication Yangtze! Yangtze! (1994) and other activists were imprisoned. Despite this suppression, the Project received a surprising vote of rejection with one-third of the committee members abstained or voted against it, when abundant abstention were registered at the National People’s Congress in 1992. Because this political venue has normally been considered as a “rubber stamp” parliament, and the TGDP already had high echelon support, the vote was unexpected.
Globally, the World Bank, which has been the largest single financial supporter of ‘mega-development projects’ in developing countries for decades, through the Asian Development Bank, and the US Export-Import Bank, refused to finance the Three Gorges Dam construction, on the ground that it had an unrealistic budget and that there remained unresolved environmental and social justice concerns surrounding the project (WCD, 2000).
The most intense debates, however, have been at the academic level, between proponents (mostly in China) and opponents (most outside of China) of the dam. The Chinese proponents argue that TGP is important for modernizing China’s economy and use in flood control as the main justification of the project. However, energy analysts have reported that the dam was not the best least cost option, and that there were numerous alternatives that would ease China’s energy crisis with far fewer impacts on the environment and human beings through massive dislocation.
2.2.2 The Ongoing and Future Dam Building on the Yangtze
According to reports from China Daily, 60 percent of the River’s Hydropower Potential on the three tributaries of the Yangtze (Yalong River (in Tibetan), Dadu River, and Wujiang River) is soon to be tapped also by dams. This represents that there will be about 50 percent of the Yangtze’s hydropower resources being utilized through dams by 2020 (McDermott, 2009).The tapping rate will be increased up to 60 percent by 2030, according to Chinese officials, compared to about 36 percent today, making the river one of the most heavily developed in the world (McDermott, 2009).
The proposed $3.75 billion-cost-1.7-gigawatts-of-electricity Xiaonanhai Dam is to be constructed by the China Three Gorges Corporation, on the Yangtze River some 40 kilometers upstream of the industrial metropolis of Chongqing. It borders the ‘core protected area’ of the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve — an area set aside specifically to mitigate some of the negative impacts of the Three Gorges Dam (Biello, 2009). In order to clear the way for dam construction and squeeze room for the reservoir from much of the preserve, the National Nature Reserve Review Committee approved the request to redraw and shrink the boundaries of the Upper Yangtze Rare and Endemic Fish National Nature Reserve, twice in 2005 and again in 2011 (Wines, 2011; International Rivers Network, 2012). This dam is just one of 20 proposed dams on the headwater tributaries of the Yangtze River upstream from the massive Three Gorges Project. Another 100 dams are planned, or are currently being built on the Yangtze River and its tributaries (Biello, 2009; China Daily, 2009). On the middle reach of Qingjiang River, a tributary of the Yangtze, the Shuibuya Dam was completed in 2009 at a cost of $1.5 billion, producing 1,600 megawatts of power (McCormack, 2001). The official figures indicated that 13,967 people have been relocated during the period of its construction (Shuibuya, n.d.). This 233-meters concrete-faced rock-fill dam represents the tallest of its kind in the world (ibid). The Xiluodu Dam is located on the Jinsha River, an upstream tributary of the Yangtze River. The construction was once halted by the Chinese government due to lack of environmental impact analysis, but its construction was resumed without much public attention in December 2005, and it is now schedules for completion in 2015 (Xiluodu, n.d.). This dam is designed to be 278 meters high and generate a massive 12,600 megawatts of power, with an investment of $7.5 billion (Xiluodu, n.d.; McCully, 2001). Another 161-meters-high the Xiangjiaba Dam is also located on the Jinsha River, with a designed power generation of 6,400 megawatts (McCully, 2001). The construction started on November 2006 and its plan for completion is in 2012 (About Xiangjiaba Hydropower; International Rivers Network, 2012). These three dams, all drawing water from the Yangtze, together have a total power generation capacity greater than that of the TGDP (McCormack, 2001).
[1] Deng Xiaoping: was a politician and reformist leader of the Communist Party of China who, after Mao’s death led his country towards a market economy.