4.3 General Migration Patterns in China
China has the poorest record on involuntary resettlement (Jackson & Sleigh, 2001). It is estimated that more than 20 million people displaced by development projects from 1950 to 2003, with over 10.2 million of these people being dislocated by water and dam projects alone (Jackson & Sleigh, 2001; Cernea, 2003). Economic impoverishment, social instability and environmental degradation are normally the consequences of those forced resettlements due to a lack of commitment or capacity to cope with a large scale displacement and resettlement. Increased economic impoverishment was a common phenomenon in resettlement areas (Li et al., 2001). Common reasons which led to the resettlement poverty phenomenon in China in the past are similar to what happened in the resettlement process associated with the TGDP. Reasons given included reference to the loss and inferior quality of farmland, extremely insufficient programs of compensation, and environmental adversities such as flooding during the period of 1950 to 1980, when reckless decisions were made to force those people who happened to live close to designated project areas to move out. There were a series of large population movements at national and regional levels during the same period (Jing, 1999; World Bank, 2001; Li et al., 2001). The leadership policies under the Mao era from the 1950s to the middle of the 1970s completely neglected any humanitarian consideration of the basic rights and welfare of dislocated people (Jing, 1999). This lack of consideration extended to rural resettlers in particular and was pathetically inadequate. This was especially true during the period of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), closely followed by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when political agendas were put in place in which resettlement planning was not to be taken seriously. The real emphasis was on the technical aspects of the development projects and the benefit to the community. The overriding task of reservoir resettlement back then was to move people out of the inundated area as soon as possible, disregarding their property losses and unwillingness to relocate, not to mention any reasonable schedule for the restoration of livelihoods in the resettlement areas (Jing, 1999; Li et al., 2001).
Hydraulic and hydroelectric projects were made as ‘development showcases’ by the central government during the period of the Great Leap Forward through a nationwide dam-building campaign (Tan & Wang, 2009). Several major dams, such as Xinanjiang dam (1957-1960) on Xinanjiang River (one of the tributaries of the Yangtze) and Sanmenxia (1957-1962) on the Yellow River, and Danjiangkou (1958-1973) on the Hanjiang River (another tributarie of the Yangtze) were built. Each of these projects displaced at least 300,000 people (also see table 1 above) (Cernea, 1997). In virtually all the cases of reservoir dislocations in China between 1950s and 1980s, humanitarian concerns for the individual, community, and regional problems, were palpably neglected, while the long-term gains for the nation as a whole were emphasized and extolled (Jing, 1999). Consequently, the attitude of government and project authorities in regard to emphasizing displacement over resettlement led to many of the country’s resettlement problems remaining unresolved even till today (Jing, 1999; Li et al., 2001). Issues of rehabilitation were seen as more protracted and difficult, since they involved restoring a community’s production capacities, while at the same time re-establishing for the individuals involved at least measure of their previous incomes, livelihoods, wellbeing and dignity. The capacity of resettlement communities to interact as equal as in their new host environments has been highly problematic (Mehta & Gupte, 2003).
In fact, it is a general knowledge that “the resettlement programs associated with virtually all major water projects undertaken in China from the late 1950s to the late 1970s failed disastrously” (Jing, 1999, p.3). They were suffering a series of so-called “leftover problems of reservoir resettlement” (ibid), including shortages of shelters, drinking water and food, medical services, school facilities, an adequate means of communications and transportation, to name only a few. These ‘inherited issues’ have been neglected and marginalized for far too long. According to a 1989 report by China’s leading poverty relief agency, there were roughly 70 percent of 10.2 million (more than seven million) reservoir outstees who were living in “extreme poverty” (Jing, 1999; McCully, 2001; Cernea, 2003). A 1994 World Bank report then acknowledged that there were almost half of the country’s reservoir refugees who had yet to be “properly resettled” and that they “were at great risk” and peril (Jing, 1999, p.5; McCully, 2001). The other four common characteristics they all shared were “low compensation, semi-political mobilization, semi-coercion” and militarized actions (Li et al. 2001, p.198).