4.5 Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that the TGDP dislocation of in excess of 1.3 million people represents an egregious violation of human rights. The Three Gorges Dam is a megaproject development that reflects the power-based preoccupation with political dominance at the expense of social justice and equity. The politicians in power not unlike Mao Zedong, typify the rigid mindset of leadership that resulted in a number of monumental resettlement disasters during the period of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Seemingly, the burning issue is about the dam and development, but it is much more. It is however actually the historical story of how the Chinese people have been made to suffer unfairly an about the profoundly socio-cultural and psychological reasons that contribute to that suffering. The controversy over the dam and its development is really a conflict caused by the power seeking authorities who seek only to maximize the vested interests of China and pretend that the general public will inherit a better future in terms of social, economic and environmental development (Topping, 1998). Reference to the ideology of the “higher good of the nation” appears to be the justificatory force in Chinese politics that informs all mega project development (Oliver-Smith, 2010). This highly collective culture comes in part from its Confucian tradition, which places an inordinately high value on collective interests over the lives of 1.3 million people which in itself is a conspicuous example of a huge collective. Their sacrifice is supposed to be justified through the principles of filial piety in order to build a hierarchical and orderly society. A different perspective is that the authoritarian dogmatism of the Communist government is far too willing to perpetrate the human rights of millions of people for the sake of economic success. The Party-State, though allowing the free market economy to run its own course in recent years, has never given up its tight control of Chinese society since 1949 (Oliver-Smith, 2010). The Party-State has a significant influence on most aspects of individual’s life in the nation, directly and simultaneously within civil society (Zhou, 1993). With intensely control of the Chinese nation by incorporating all social groups and all citizens into a similar structural position as long as they are subordinate to the State. Communitarianism argues that “society dwells within a collective value system and claims that the fulfillment of collective goals is a higher priority than individual interests” (Chang & Chu, 2002, p.8). Thereby, the individuals’ sacrifice for the common good is encouraged and highly praised. Yet, the individual has never represented predominately in the calculus of China’s long political history, whether dynastic, the Nationalists Party, or the Communists Government (Oliver-Smith, 2010). As a result, individuals and especially the subaltern class are indoctrinated to exhibit a spontaneous articulation of self-destructive behavioral response to State policies which exploit their nationalist patriotism (Zhou, 1993). Pierre Gourou (1975, p.145) commented that, instilled with the Confucian moral principles, is a social framework which “compris[ed] the family, the clan, the village and the state… and a hierarchy of political institutions belonging to the state created a vast and durable woven framework that made [Chinese] civilization particularly effective, in controlling vast numbers of people spread over vast territories, for thousands of years” (see also Wang, 2011, p.51). Confucianism has guided generations of Chinese despite decades of anti-Confucian movement. The experience of Communism in the PRC has expanded the Confucian faith in nationalism as moral justification for inequity, and social injustice. The Confucian tradition of respect for authority, communitarianism and family, while valuing filial piety, self-discipline and submission, on the ground of respecting patriarchal tradition, and the established order, can be summarized as the absolute value of the group over individual, autonomy, liberty, and human rights (Huntington, 1997). This lack of importance of individualism, natural law, and individual freedom presents a radically conflicting orientation, when compared with western images of liberalism (Dalton & Ong, 2005; Fröhlich, 2008; Kallio, 2011). “Three Guides and Five Constants” served as leadership doctrines strangles the development of democracy and humanity by promoting authoritarian rather than non-hierarchical familial and social relationships based on equality (Louie, 1984). Authoritarian collectivism attempts to regard a collection of individuals as having only a single identity. That could explain that although the number of individuals affected by the TGDP is great, the notion of the individual vs. the collective group still stands given the nature of the vulnerability of the affected group based on their economic status, geographical location and political power. “Harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties tends to be viewed as dangerous” (Huntington, 1997, p.9). Most importantly, Confucianism and Communism have merged as a way of legitimating State Control, despite the absence of a legal framework to provide legitimation for autonomous social institutions in China to exist at the national level (Huntington, 1997). According to this rationale, traditional Confucianism values formed the foundation of a patriarchal clan system which contradicts the fundament belief of equity enshrined in values such as individualism, liberalism, and rule of law that stands above existing social relationships. What has been lost is the ground for individual conscience to serve as a fundamental source of moral authority, especially when we realize that China accepts with impunity the fact that approximately 45 million people have been mad e to suffer and sacrifice their rights in the mane of ‘the good of the nation’ (Fukuyama, 1995; Chu et al., 2004).