4.4 Control and Obedience ― a Chinese Power Game
It has been argued that “involuntary population displacement and resettlement are widespread enough, big enough, frequent enough, complex and consequential enough to merit the full mobilization of the conceptual, analytical and operational tools available to address it” (Cernea, quoted in Kothari, 1996, p.1481). It is also clear that impoverishment has become the primary legacy of population displacements from large development projects, and indicates that there are fundamental flaws in the way in which involuntary resettlement has been carried out. We can also see that all too often those who address the problems are treating the symptom of problems, not only their root causes (Deng, 2001). Some scholars have argued that the problems associated with displacement and resettlement situates the debate surrounding development right in the context of a wider social, economic, cultural and political context (Kothari, 1996). This more comprehensive framework affords an opportunity to investigate the etiology or root of these problems, thereby advancing our understanding of this trilogy of issue in a more ‘holistic manner’. In the case of the TGDP it should at this stage of the thesis be evident that China’s commitment to the Epistemology of Power, as Laura has called it (Laura et al., 2008), has given rise to a hybridized form of Communism which has politicized the “structural problems of nation-building: mismanagement of identity conflicts, gross inequities in the shaping and sharing of power, national wealth, opportunities for development, and chronic abuse of power resulting in egregious violations of human rights” (Deng, 2001, p.154). Without a comprehension of these epistemological elements of ideology, the “investigation of the causes” of social injustice will remain cosmetic. This being so, efforts at minimizing the impacts upon displacement oustees and the challenge of improving resettlement performance will only be “marginal, palliative and temporary” (Kothari, 1996, p.1476). Any propagandist efforts which primarily target only the ‘symptoms’ of these problems will inevitably fail to improve the overall socio-economic and socio-cultural security of the communities of people who are displaced, along with their host communities (Kothari,1996). It is evident that these people should by no means have to bear an undue loss of lifestyle quality, due to the influx of relocatees.
In the previous section, I provided a brief account of the traumatic time that displaced persons have faced during recent resettlement, due directly to badly planned development projects and their ‘rights’ of passage, so to say. For decades, most of the involuntary migrants were excluded from the process of state development planning concerning their general welfare and education. Hence, many of these people, through ignorance, have been unable to enjoy the exercise of their official rights, and their collective bargaining power has been both inaudible and feeble (Roy, 2002). The Three Gorges Dam construction reflects the ideological politicization of power, expressed as a form of nationalism. As a consequence, bureaucratic and administrative manipulation and control of displaced persons has largely represented a violation of their rights (Webber, 2011). The way in which China has managed to displace people from their land and homes, with less than 24 hours’ notice in some cases, as we have earlier in this and other chapters observed, rests on an ideological distortion of the moral principle of self-sacrifice for the greater good, coupled with power-based intimidations. It is partly true that the majority of displaced people have shown their willingness to sacrifice their own welfare because the government has used the so called ‘greater common good’ principle as a tool of deception. Although reservoir refugees are not happy with the arrangement of the dislocation, they still do what the government wants them to do without major resistance. Paternalism, grounded in the epistemology of power, becomes a significant ideological force, especially when backed by police and the military authority. Officials and politicians think that they know what is best for (ignorant and illiterate) peasants, and in turn act politically as if they know how to achieve it. Further control is gained, however, by connecting the leverage of paternalism, with the moral virtue of sacrifice for the good of the nation. I call this version of power-politics ‘Patriarchal Patriotism’, which combines the moral and patriarchal obligation to sacrifice oneself for the common good of the nation, with the paternalism presumption that what you are obliged to do for the nation is legitimated as being in your best interest.
Yet this commitment to epistemology of power is not just a modern characteristic of the Chinese society: it has been inherited and passed down from prerevolutionary history for at least a thousand years (Furushima, 1972). Likewise, the Three Gorges Dam reflects this deeply rooted conviction of political power that has a history well over two thousand years old (McCormack, 2001; Escobar, 2003). The engineering mentality of dam construction deploys technology with the explicit aim of domination and manipulation of nature to gain control of nature to suit human ends and vested interests. Such vested interests clearly antedate modern development (Webber, 2011). This is ultimately a power game which has been played in China for millennia. Power and control through cultural propaganda, institutional indoctrination, military and police force presence and action, coercion and punishment have figured prominently in the history of China’s political evolution.
Having established the way in which the Epistemology of Power has become an ideological tool of political control, I seek to broaden the agenda of this research on dam-induced involuntary resettlement and explore the roles played by the social, cultural and psychological manipulation of mass populations of Chinese who have suffered developmental displacement since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. I intend to examine the topic of the combinative influence of Chinese cultural values by constructing and contrasting two primary and idealized cultural archetypes (if not stereotypes). The first of these is Confucianism with its emphasis on traditionalism, and the second is Communism, with its main emphasis on Maoism. Collectivism could plausibly be squared as a third element of socio-cultural influence, but it is not so much a discrete facet or individual archetype, as it is an element which is enfolded and entwined in varying extents to both Confucianism and Communism. I shall endeavour to show a different facet of their influence upon contemporary Chinese people, especially those being forced to dislocate and resettled.
To analyse this strained archetypal trinity is no small task, in part because different theories of the archetypes, themselves, can lead us to different assumptions and to highlight different methodological insights accordingly. In assessing the Chinese power game which galvanized regarding the forced displacement in the first place, it is important to note that some analysts emphasizes on China’s motivations and capabilities, which would raise another question on where the motivations come from (Hui, 2008). In order to answer such a question, naturally, the first thing we look at is the cultural traits based on the collective memory and shared by the general public of a nation. Collective memory is expressed by organized historical knowledge and cultural belief (McNeil, 1985). The history does help us understand the thought and behaviour of Chinese people, society and nation as a whole and provide us the possibly best available guide for effective actions and policies (McNeil, 1985; Stearns, 1998; Hui, 2008). The intersection of human nature, politics and our own day-to-day behaviours took shape over hundreds of thousands of years. The memories of the interaction have been preserved and changed slowly over the generations to our present time and to the future (McNeil, 1985). This being so, some researchers claimed that history will often repeat itself, and that the value of historical knowledge can explain and even justify what happened at present (McNeil, 1985; Hui, 2008). Others argued that it depends principally on how history has been interpreted and reinterpreted—“asking new questions, searching new sources and finding new meanings in old documents”—rather than in the ‘factual’, (I use the term advisedly) history itself (McNeil, 1985, para.5; Hui, 2008). The Chinese masses may have in certain periods been influenced by dominant analysis and interpretations of history expounded before their time, but they seem to also be influenced by other interlocking factors in their own time as well. What is clear is that the ebb and flow of varied historical attitudes shaped by historical circumstances, toward the use of power, and to power itself (Hui, 2008).
The zealous political impositions of huge planning projects and associated forced displacement are merely the presentation of the ideology of power-based epistemology which has dominated the Chinese value system, especially over the last half century. Yet, before exploring how the cultural change in China shapes the Chinese mindset and behaviours, it is essential to examine how Chinese culture has profoundly impacted on past and current Chinese ruling classes, who provide the source of institutionally legitimized power over ordinary Chinese folk. Any study or predictions of the future should examine Chinese cultural attributes and their impacts on current and recently past Chinese watershed political events in order to achieve a solid understanding. Thus, the purpose of this next part of the chapter is to examine some of the research literature on the evolution of Chinese culture and leadership which help document the major logical commitments which serve to illuminate covert perspectives involved in explaining political choice of strategy in Chinese society: concern for power relationships, collective interests, and interpersonal norms (Lin, 2008).
4.4.1 Culture, Knowledge and Chinese Value System
“Values represent the deepest level of a culture. They are broad feelings, often unconscious and not open to discussion, about what is good and what is bad, clean or dirty, beautiful or ugly, rational or irrational, normal or abnormal, natural or paradoxical, decent or indecent. These feelings are present in the majority of the members of the culture, or at least in those persons who occupy pivotal positions.” (Hofstede, 1994b, p.10)
There is general agreement that that the behavior of people within any particular nation will be affected, informed and shaped, in large part, by cultural principles, the common values and social norms as their compatriots (Hofstede, 1991, 1993 & 1994b; Smith & Bond, 1998)[1].For the purposes of this chapter I shall define cultural values as “those enduring beliefs that establish stable principles to guide the roles and relationships of people in a particular society” (Chan, 2001, p.394). Numerous studies have been done to determine the impact of socio-cultural dispositions on various aspects of individual behavior, community, and organizational behavior. Leadership, decision making, communication and negotiation, behavioral modes and lifestyle have all been shown to be influenced by national culture (Cheng & Sculli, 2001). I have intimated earlier, every culture presupposes epistemological principles which govern its interpretive interactions with and ideological descriptions of the world (Smith, 1992; Adler, 1997; Cheng & Sculli, 2001; Laura & Cotton, 2010). Social scientists use “values almost exclusively to ‘unpack’ the psychological effects of culture on behaviour” (Bond et al., 2004, p.189). It has been argued that the value–attitude–behavior hierarchy connects the power of cultural beliefs to predictive behaviour, both conceptually and practically (Homer & Kahle, 1988; Chan, 2001; Smith & Bond, 2003; Bond et al., 2004). According to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Hofstede (1991, 1993 &1994), values are largely “formed from and nurtured by interpersonal relationships and social orientations” (Chan, 2001, p.392) and become epistemological foundations of socio-cultural behavioral disposition (Laura & Cotton, 2010).
This is especially pertinent to advancing our understanding of the uniqueness of Chinese culture. Chinese culture is characterized by what has been called a “collectivistic relationship orientation”, on the one hand and an “authoritarian orientation”, on the other (Cheung et al., 2001).
Investigations of Chinese cultural influences reveal that power relationships exist amongst Chinese people and in politics (Chen & Chung, 1994; Javidan et al., 2006). Chinese scholars have focused either on one single cultural influence, or have endeavoured to treat Chinese culture as a system blended with distinct sets of values (Tsui et al., 2004). The mainstream scholars on Chinese culture has primarily focused on the cultural impacts of three distinct, yet interconnected philosophical and political traditions and their accompanying value systems in the scholarly literature: Confucianism, Collectivism, and Communism (Lin, 2008). We shall see shortly, as suggested earlier, that Collectivism, is interwoven and overlaps both with Confucianism and Chinese Communism.
Confucianism
Although some studies suggest that Confucianism alone cannot be equated to traditional Chinese philosophy of culture which represents a complex amalgam of diverse value systems such as Daoism, Legalism, Mohism and Buddhism, many Chinese and western scholars concur that Confucianism has been the major determinatively defining influence in Chinese culture (Cheung & Chan, 2005). Embraced in a variety of ways by Chinese culture for over 2000 years, Confucianism has been a foundational philosophy and value-laden foundational perspective of socio-cultural longevity. According to a number of scholars, Confucianism is the most influential ‘life-orienting’ philosophy which shapes and informs China’s diverse and immense population (Fung, 1947; Tu, 1985a & 1985b; Bond & Hwang, 1986; Pye, 1995; Ralston, 1996; Kallio, 2011). It has been argued that Chinese political attitudes and leadership behavior are best characterized by Legalism, rather than by Confucianism (Tu, 1985b; Fukuyama, 1995; Lin, 2008). None the less, in terms of governing people and shaping the ‘values-orientation of the ‘people of China’, Confucianism has undoubtedly played a central role in defining the behavioural attitudes of the Chinese people, thereby producing generations of obedient citizens. This socio-cultural attitude of submissiveness has made governing such a massive population of ethnic diversity feasible. Thus, it is not surprising that Confucianism has figured so prominently as an important cultural factor in the unfolding of political history and evolution of Chinese leadership.
Confucianism has epitomized the officially-sanctioned core values of China since the Han dynasty (206BC-220AD) until communists took over in 1949. Its philosophy and doctrines are deeply embedded in the minds of a vast number of Chinese over many generations (Fung, 1947; Tu, 1985a & 1985b; Bond & Hwang, 1986; Pye, 1995; Ralston, 1996). Since 1949, the year of the foundation of People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government has severely restricted freedom of the press and largely controlled the content of all major newspapers, TV stations, and internet facilities throughout the country. Rigid restrictions on the media and TV influence of foreign culture within Chinese society have been acute since the late 1970s. As a consequence, the potential impact of the core values of Confucianism was explicitly suppressed (Ralston et al., 1995; Kallio, 2011). Nevertheless, neither the ‘modernization’ of China nor the ‘secularization’ which followed from Mao’s Great Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) could demolish the centuries of societal adherence to Confucian traditional values (Lachman, 1983; Zuo, 1991; Yang, 1986 &1995; Ralston et al., 1996; Chang & Chu, 2002; Kallio, 2011). The long-term historical process of Confucian perspective has inspired deeply-rooted traditional and cultural values that have proved resistant to change, especially changes that directly contradict any previously established ideologies and political theories of the ruling class (Chang & Chu, 2002). The resilience of Confucianism in China amidst the repressive regime of Communist politics is a measure of its ubiquitous philosophical tenacity and importance for Chinese society (Bond, 1988; Ralston et al., 1996)
Communism
It is well-known that China remains firmly under communist rule, though it is not emphasized within China these days that its original philosophical form was inherited from the former Soviet Union. Communism in China now exists as a quite remarkable political hybrid which functions well as a modality of what I shall call, ‘Communist Capitalism’. It is also clear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rules China as the predominate source of power controlling Chinese companies, organizations and the individual lives of Chinese citizens. This magnitude of control includes the determination to restrain what people are allowed to learn at school and watch on TV (Manion, 1985; Chamberlain, 1987; Chan, 2004; Hui, 2008; Madariage Reprot, 2011). Its ideological basis is, deriving mainly from Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, while Deng Xiaoping Theory persists as a major influence in Chinese national and international affairs, shaping management, organizational and individual practices, including leadership throughout all the various provinces in China (Zhou, 1993; Shenkar, 1996; Kallio, 2011). Despite the economic success China has come to enjoy, it has been widely discussed and agreed that there is a moral/spiritual vacuum in China today after the psychological disillusionment arising from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. It is clear that Communism does not serve as the foundation for the moral and spiritual inspiration which joins a nation together with the dream of a ‘purposive life,’ rather than just a ‘purposive economy’ (Snell & Tseng, 2002; Kallio, 2011).
Collectivism
Collectivism is, as intimated earlier, the third facet of the archetypal trinity of defining socio-cultural values for China. It functions historically most effectively by being interwoven through both Confucianism and Communism, thus shaping the orientation of both. China is widely regarded as being a very ‘collectivist’ society. Unlike Confucianism and Communism, Collectivism is not indigenous to China. However, it is clear that Chinese culture measures a very high scale on the ‘collectivism’, at least when contrasted with most western cultures which are blatantly considered to be much more individualistic. Collectivism in China is very much influenced and blended into Chinese mainstream culture as a modality of what I shall call ‘Confucian and Communist Collectivism’. On this construal, I am proposing that we can regard China, in general, as a collectivist society in the sense that it strives to encourage and foster a sense of in-group harmony and group belonging, whether the group constitutes family, friends, workmates, communities, or even the notion of the ‘group’ when construed as a country.
Despite irreversible changes that have taken place, traditional values and norms, however supressed and modified, still play a central role by continuing to “exert their influence on the socialization process and leave their indelible marks” on Chinese people in modern-day (Ho, 1986, p.48). Instead of working in isolation, the three cultural systems are embedded and interact with each other in shaping Chinese behaviours, including leadership practice in China (Lin, 2008). Let now endeavour to examine these connections more determinately.
The Impact of Confucianism
Confucianism, . . . is a worldview, a social ethic, a political [ideo]logy, a scholarly tradition, and a way of life. . . . Both in theory and practice, Confucianism has made an indelible mark on the government, society, education, and family of East Asia. . . .(Tu, 1998b, p.3)
Confucianism, though mercilessly denigrated and discredited during the Cultural Revolution, was strong enough in the Chinese public consciousness to survive, if only as a glimmer of hope amidst the ideological insanity of the Cultural Revolution. The roots of Confucianism and its paradigmatic life-value perceptions remain deeply enshrined in the Chinese psyche. Despite the cavalier dismissal Confucianism it received from the Cultural Revolution’s propagandists, it still persisted at the worst of times, if only as a candle of hope for those who could feel that the ‘enforced atheism’ of Communism was suffocating China’s potential for spiritual directedness. Indeed, I submit that one reason why the epistemology of power was so easily reconfigured into the Communist power politics of China was that ‘enforced atheism’ permits violation of human rights. It is this loss of moral conscience that has ensured that the inhumane displacement of millions of Chinese people continues to take place. Were it not for Confucian conceptions and values, the growing awareness and increasing protest of the magnitude of human degradation and the violation of human rights would be inaudible. This being so, I want to look more closely the analysis of the influence of Confucianism on the Chinese people’s mindset, behavior and growing awareness.
Confucius is the most influential and respected philosopher in Chinese history (Fung, 1947; Tu, 1998a & 1998c). The legacy of Confucius (551-479 BC), the Master who taught personal and governmental morality and virtue, devotion to family/social relationships, justice and sincerity, remains strong but to some extent covert in present-day China. There have many versions or interpretations of Confucius over the last hundreds of years. However, I have no intension in this thesis to add yet another version of my own, nor am I interested in divagating to evaluate the previously established versions that exist. Instead, I will be focusing on the manifestation of the secularization of Confucianism in actual theory and practice, without being overly concerned with the abstract philosophical issues of debate surrounding it. Widely accepted and preserved Confucius values are expressed mostly at the ‘psychological’ level, which have become the core doctrines of secular teaching and community transformation (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Directing the basic tenets of individual moral conducts, interpersonal interactions and cultural consciousness in Chinese society, there is no doubt that much of this value system came mainly from the past. This being so, it is clear that subtly internalized moral values therefore have grave influences on the behaviors and thinking dispositions of Chinese people (Tu, 1990; Hofstede, 1991; Ching, 1994; Lee, 2003). Some call this way of looking at the subject “Secular Confucianism” or “Popular Confucianism”, which to some extent represents a departure from the classical tradition (Tu, 1985b; Fukuyama, 1995; Lee, 2003). This being so, the term “Confucianism” used here is not in the strict classical sense, but rather a general description of the cultural traits originated and developed by Confucius himself and his disciples, which have come to serve as a practical guide governing Chinese patterns of socialization (Ho, 1994; Milligan, 2008). I will review Confucian doctrines, conceptions and values relevant to the family, the organisations and the nation, as well as interpersonal relationships, and point out how those values might well have influenced public decision making and behavioural dispositions in a secular Chinese society (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Confucius values of loyalty, duty, harmony, benevolence, conscience, and sympathy are in various ways explored and promoted in Confucianism (Fung, 1947). Despite its commitment to such moral values, it is paradoxical that Confucianism also emphasizes the importance of filial submission of intergenerational relationships by reference to its role in the preservation of historical continuity (Ho, 1994). It urges individuals to adapt to a form of behavioural collectivism which legislates the restraint of personal desires and emotions, thereby compromising self-interest for the benefit of the collective, group or society. This in turn is intended to avoid conflict, and maintain social harmony (Yan & Sorenson, 2006)
This version of the teachings of Confucius and his disciples began to gain official prominence as the only orthodox state philosophy in Chinese society from the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC~ 8 AD) (Tu, 1990; Leng, 2005). This period is known as the “suppression of the hundred schools and the exclusive recognition of Confucianism” (fei chu bai jia, du zun ru zhu), and its pedagogy has continued to hold a prominent status until the early 20th Century (Leng, 2005, p.21). Chinese families and schools often use stories, sayings, and proverbs to instil Confucian ideals of Collectivism in young children. “Twenty-four Stories of Filial Piety” is a good example (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). By the time of the Tang Dynasty (618~907AD) the Confucian classics had become the basis for the great civil service examinations that provided the major source of bureaucrats and magistrates for the Chinese imperial administration. To hold any official regional, regional and national position in China, you had also to embrace Confucian Collectivist philosophy with commitment. Works of Confucius and his disciples such as Da Xue (Great Learning), Lun Yu (Analects), Zhong Yong (Doctrine of the Mean), and Menzi (Mencius) (Fung, 1947; Tu, 1998c) have been strongly recommended by Neo-Confucianists[2]. These manuscripts are still widely used by governing administrations as core content for educational curricula and civil service examinations for Chinese students of all ages, dating from the Song Dynasty (960–1279) until the beginning of the 20th century (Leng, 2005). The Westernization Movement of Science and Technology launched after the middle of the 19th Century by Chinese intellectuals emphasized that the western learning played a part in practical education, and Chinese Confucianism learning played the role in setting out the fundamental moral structures of collectivist disposition to be universally emulated. Confucian classics thus became not unlike the Bible of the state pedagogy (Keating, 2004; Leng, 2005). It has pervaded, guided, and informed the social interaction of people at all levels — between individuals, communities, and nations throughout various societies such as Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia in addition to China (Fung, 1947; Tu, 1998a & 1998c; Chang & Chu, 2002; Dalton, R.J. & Ong, 2005;). It is a vast set of beliefs, concepts, rituals and principles developed and actively taught by Confucius and his successors for more than 2,000 years (Hofstede, 1991; Tu, 1998c). Confucian guidelines and manuscripts were written for all components of society (Fung, 1947 & 1983; Gong, 1989; Tu, 1990). Advocates of Confucianism gained extensive knowledge of its rules and rituals, defining the proper codes of conduct particularly within the family and society. The power of Confucian doctrines, and the extent of its profound influence on the development of Chinese civilization has been momentous (Fung, 1947; Hofstede, 1991; Tu, 1998 a & 1998c). Its philosophy incorporated was extensively into the lives and communities of so many people from different socio-cultural backgrounds over many centuries. Coupled with elitist manipulation of its doctrines by political parties and cultural elites, its enduring integration into Chinese cultures thereby defining the values and the psychological character of the Chinese people has also been profound (Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Although the official Confucian imperial examinations ended with the demise of the last Imperial Dynasty of Qing in 1912, the ensuing campaigns by various Chinese governments to minimize the influence of Confucian philosophy upon the life style of Chinese people were never successful. Confucian values and ideologies remain deeply woven into the everyday lives of Chinese people and their view of social politics, as part of China’s ‘officialdom’, and subsequently part of its formative culture (Gong, 1989; De Bary, 1998; Tu, 1998c; Ralston et al., 1996 & 1999; Littrell, 2005; Yan & Sorenson, 2006). The profound influence of Confucianism cannot be ignored, and its status as a philosophy of visionary edification on how to live in harmony with nature and each other is currently unofficially being rejuvenated.
Five Relations (Wu Lun), Filial Piety and Authoritarianism
Confucius defined five basic social relationships as ‘Wu Lun’: father and son (parent-child), ruler and subject (sovereign-subject), husband and wife, elder and younger sibling, and friend and friend. The Five Relations concept dictates that the hierarchy of ordered social relationships is the principal foundation upon which the highly complex, interlocking web of interpersonal relations within Chinese society should be constructed (Tan, 2003).
Among the five relationships, the first four relations are defined as hierarchical relations, whereas only the last is a relation of equals (Tu, 1998d). According to Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, stability and harmony in society is based on a properly ordered hierarchy of relations which defines the roles that everyone relates to each other, by meeting the mutual complementarity of role-obligations (Bond & Hwang, 1986; Tan, 2003; Tan & Chee, 2005). It urges individuals to adapt and behave in relation to others in a socially hierarchical structure (Redding & Wong, 1986; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). The balance and harmony in such social interaction is upheld and brought to fruition by the five relationships through the behavioral mediation of the five virtues (Wu De) (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Tu, 1998a; Tan & Chee, 2005). The five virtues are defined as: humanity/benevolence (Ren), righteousness (Yi), propriety (Li), wisdom (Zhi), and trustworthiness (Xin). Confucius summed up the unfolding of these relationships in these words: “With righteousness in the heart, there will be beauty in the character. With beauty in the character, there will be harmony in the home. With harmony in the home, there will be order in the nation. With order in the nation, there will be peace in the world” (Confucius, opening text of The Great Learning).
Family relationship in Confucianism is the foundation of the proper relational order of the society (Tan, 2003). In traditional society, all Chinese families, whether peasant or landlord, adopted a patriarchal and a patrilocal system that was established under certain historical and geological circumstance (Hamilton, 1990). The father had absolute and the highest power over the entire family, and it was decreed that the rest of family members should show obedience and respect to the father’s authority. A similar hierarchical relationship exists, according to Confucius, between the ruler and the subjects, in which the subjects are expected to be submissive to their rulers and authorities, while the rulers and authorities are expected to be kind and caring to his/her subjects, following the same familial code of father/son relationships. Such attitudes of filial piety are also noted between superior and subordinate, teacher and student, employer and employee, and so on (Tu, 1998d; Yeh, 2003; Yan & Sorenson, 2006). Confucius and his disciples therefore imposed a strong social hierarchy on the individual status otherwise associated with a specifically relative position (Rarick, 2007). When everyone is aware of his/her place, duty and proper conducts in accordance with his/her position in life, the hierarchy is ensured (Hamilton, 1990; Yeh, 2003). The society follows the same basic principles of morality starting from the family right up to the Emperor. An orderly and harmonious society would be maintained through the application of the same ethical codes of conduct throughout the hierarchy. The ethical codes of conduct that all people, be they farmers or emperors, should abide is determined by the five virtues. Thus, the parent has his/her duties and obligations to the children and as a consequence of this, the ethical code of conduct and behavior need to be followed by the children towards the parents and older siblings. This is the genesis of filial piety still embraced by most or all Chinese families of Confucian persuasion (Toh, 2009). Confucius recognized that the whole of society is a part of a larger family, with the clan system, defining different communities within specific dialect groups. The province with the State Governor and the Emperor were also defined as being parts of an extended family, with their respective responsibilities based on justice and harmonious living (Toh, 2009). Hierarchy is respected; society is ordered and harmony is achieved at all levels based on filial submission (Tan, 2003).
Ho (1986 &1994) argues that the extremely strong sense of filial piety as a defining attitude in the family situation represents the moral code that most Chinese people have long upheld, but it is the same principle that may also be responsible for the formation of authoritarian orientations (Yang, 1995). Indeed, many authors have contended that ‘familism’ is one of the important foundations of Chinese traditional cultures (Redding & Wong, 1986; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Tu, 1998d; Tan, 2003; Yeh, 2003; Dalton & Ong, 2005; Toh, 2009). This suggests that, for those who embraced this traditional form of Collectivism (whatever status he/she holds in society), authoritarian filial piety is rendered as having to oppress oneself psychologically, physically, and socially, as the collective community need requires (Sung, 1990). Therefore, within the political area, my point is that the Chinese tend to behave like subordinates, treating government officials as authority figures, who can and have often, easily manipulated the general public with their authoritative propaganda. Unless the subject becomes aware clearly of his own seniority status in this role relationship, the obligation to obedience is absolute. This explains in part why the displacement of some ten million reservoir refugees has caused so little trouble from the ever obedient farmers who have been obliged to have their homes, land and livelihoods. Because it was only natural for ordinary Chinese to “form such psychological and behavioral tendencies as authority sensitization, worship and dependence”, the exploitation by the government has not been questioned (Yang, 1995, p.32). Even the hierarchical structure of authority within the family was justified by the absolute and unchallengeable status ‘parental given’ to authority of their children. The obligations incurred by filial piety in the family were thus surreptitiously extended or generalized by the political authorities or anyone else senior in generational rank such as the local magistrate (fu-mu guanin Chinese,literally ‘parent-officials’) to exploit those beneath them for the sake of their own vested interests (Yang, 1995). The Emperor of course, who once symbolized the status of ‘ultimate-father authority’ in respect of which all others are inferior in generational rank, with commoners at the bottom, had absolute control of everyone (Ho, 1994; Yeh, 2003). However, in modern times this traditional attitude of filial piety has shifted from imperial/patriarchal authority and to official/patriarchal authority (Yang, 1995; Rarick, 2007). None the less, forms of rank and hierarchy still acutely manifest themselves in the managerial practices throughout many levels of present Chinese society (Rarick, 2007). In a typical Chinese organization, be they a village or a work unit, decisions are often made by the top leaders of the organization and everyone else in this organization is expected to carry out those directives unconditionally (Yang, 1995; Rarick, 2007). Employees in the social and family organizations which are characterized by and reflect the authoritarian approach of filial piety, are expected to be loyal to their organization and the paternalistic organization is expected to take care of them by providing housing, childcare, health care, and other benefits which are uncommon in the West, to make sure interaction between them is smooth and harmonious (Yeh, 2003; Rarick, 2007). Yang (1995) called this interactional system “authoritarian orientation”.
A strong “authoritarian orientation” is based on the moral imperative of filial piety to show deference to authorities and to accept traditional beliefs-values, and societal norms unconditionally (Yang, 1995). Therefore, the sense of official authority has originated and derived from patriarchal authority. Patriarchal authority consolidates its absolute power in the family context through previously established rites and conventional norms. The ruling class usually establishes and reinforces official/patriarchal authority through national apparatuses such as laws, media and education. The tradition of imperial authority has evolved and re-invented and embedded itself in the authoritarian social-political system in contemporary Chinese society (Wang, 1988; Yang, 1995). Authoritarian filial piety is thus characterized by absolute or blind submission to authorities, and the patriarchal oppression of self-autonomy has served as a guiding principle which still governs the lives of the Chinese population by shaping and informing the contemporary Chinese pattern of socialization (Ho, 1986 &1994; Yang, 1995; Yeh, 2003).
Confucianism, Family Values and Collectivism
Our body, with hair and skin, is derived from our parents. One should not hurt one’s own body in any situation. This is the starting point of filial piety. (Hsiao Ching, Chapter 1: The Starting Point and the Principles)
Previous research has also suggested that Confucian values and guidelines also contribute to the forming of collective characteristics within Chinese society (Redding & Wong, 1986; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Li & Karakowsky, 2002; Hui, 2008). Confucian ideology such as filial piety, authoritarian attitude, male superiority, fatalism, control, and self-restraint for the benefit of the group reinforces the rationale of filial piety. The avoidance of conflict to maintain harmony represents an unique collectivist nature (with the family model serving as the prototype of all social organizations (Bond & Wang, 1981; Hwang, 1987; Hofstede, 1991). This being so, it is clear that the basic unit of Chinese society is not the individual, but the family (Hofstede, 1991; Toh, 2009). Thus, the ‘familistic collectivism’ has become the prototype of the Chinese collective society (Hwang, 2001). Research has established that the Chinese manifest these same patterns in non-familial organizations ― such as schools, companies, factories and villages. In this sense, it is clear that China is a fundamentally collectivistic society. According to some scholars, this involves a complex process of generalization which Yang (1986 & 1995, p.23) has termed ‘familization’ or ‘pan-familization’. All non-familial organizations in Chinese society follow the suit of structure and function of a family (Lin, 1988). Most Chinese receive “a prolonged period of severe, and usually systematic, socialization through rather rigid domestic discipline” (Yang, 1995, p.23) in their families when they are young, and in turn these family experiences of socialization are also strengthened in schools. Both family teaching and school education emphasizes the sacrifice of oneself to satisfy the collectivist concern towards others and the entire group or community, which leads to the “formation of embedded attitudes, thoughts and behaviours of a collectivistic nature” (ibid). Young generations of Chinese therefore adopt social and organizational life outside the family and perform social interactions based on those cognitive patterns imprinted from family and school (Yang, 1995).
Thus, personal goals, self-interests, and the welfare of the individual are subordinated to the interests of the collective; in this sense the individual is insignificant and socially invisible without the group. The interests of the groups, in the form of family, organization, or the whole society, always precede that of the individuals. As a result, the individual member of a family or group loses his/her individuality and idiosyncrasies (ibid). This kind of collectivist culture emphasizes in-group values and norms, emphasizes group cohesiveness and the directives of authorities (Yeh, 2003). In such a social network, a typical Chinese cannot but surrender. They are expected sometimes to sacrifice his or her individuality in order to realize the overall interest of the groups to which they belong (Tu, 1985a & 1985b; Hofstede, 1991; Chan, 2001). In order to maintain social order and harmony, the “Three Guides” [ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife] and the “Five Constants” [benevolence (Ren), righteousness (Yi), propriety (Li), knowledge (Zi), and sincerity (Xin)] must be followed. Confucius claimed that to achieve the national advancement, certain sacrifices are expected to be made by the individuals (Rarick, 2007). Therefore the concept of being sacrificed for the greater common good is a general expectation of Confucian socialization. This concept is manifested in Confucianism as “to die to achieve ‘Ren’” (Benevolence/Humanity). Therefore, ‘Ren’ has a strong collective orientation (Yan & Sorenson, 2004). Further, according to Confucian teaching, in order to attain ‘Ren’, ‘Li’ (Propriety) must be kept (Kallio, 2011). Luo (1999) quotes Zuo Zhuan: “If Li [Propriety] is not followed, the division between the upper and lower classes will become muddled, and how could the dynasty survive over generations then?”(quoted in Kallio, 2011, p.78). This being so, keeping Li [Propriety] has a submissive tendency to authority and encourages “self-sacrifice for the good of others and community, self-restraints in pursuing one’s personal interests, and self-effacement when interacting with the other people” (Yan & Sorenson, 2004, p.9). The utilitarian expectations of self-orientation derived from this value-framework driven project planners, as in the case of dam construction to push forward the TGDP in the name of so-called long-term gains for the nation as a whole, with neglect of individual and local concerns (Webber, 2011).
There are many pro-dam Chinese high ranking officials whose justification for moving forward with the dam project, despite evidence to the contrary is based on the belief, or at least the belief of the Chinese population that self-sacrifice for the greater good in project situations such as this serves the greater good of modernization and progress. For example, when Wan Jiazhu, Vice President of the China Three Gorges Project Corp, was interviewed in 2000 by Reporter Martia Sharp from the Star Weekly in Germany, who drew attention to the violation of human rights associated with the more than a million people displaced by the TGDP, he responded by saying, “When the dam was being planned… representatives of the upstream area [who will be moved] investigated the middle and downstream area. They understood that in the case of a large flood, people in the downstream plain area would have no way to escape [no hills to mount]. They thought it would be worth it to sacrifice some [of their] interests” (quoted in Jones & Freeman, 2001). Similarly, the Three Gorges Corporation senior engineer Li Junlin expressed the same view:
With a tall level, the dam costs a lot, but with a bigger dam it can improve the flood-control situation more than before and we can protect more people downstream. If the reservoir is big, it’s more effective for flood control. If it’s too small, it can’t help much. The lower the water, the lower income we get from power. And as a result of the dam, people downstream benefit more than people upstream suffer from the adverse effects of the dam. If one person has to be resettled, but then ten people are protected from flood downstream, then I’m for building it (quoted in Ash, 1998, p.82).
4.4.2 Authoritarianism, Control and the Politics of Project Development
It should be clear that despite its enlightenment, the Confucius tradition is responsible in a major way for the Chinese preoccupation with hierarchy and control, which is represented institutionally as the paternalistic and authoritarian style of leadership management. These characteristics are practiced by Chinese both in China and overseas. Confucian social thinking has highly stressed the importance of the rigid hierarchy of the Chinese family in whatever society Chinese people find themselves (Wang, 2005). One consequence of this is that the members of a collectivist culture are largely influenced by the behaviours, emotions and thoughts of the communities in which they live, but particularly by the groups of people with whom they interact (Triandis & Suh, 2002). The ‘Five Relationships’ emphasize proper conducts and roles for members in a family as well as in an organisation; the ‘Three Guides’ are the moral principles for an orderly society; the “Five Constants” provide society with an ethical framework and emphasizes the importance of harmony (Ko, 2002). In Confucianism, harmony is the highest good. The environment in the eye of people in a collectivist culture as more or less fixed (duties, obligations, and rules) and should be ‘fit in’ by the people in it. People are changeable under such collectivist culture and expected to “conform to well-defined roles and are bound by the obligations entailed by those roles” (McGrath et al., 1992, p.446). For Confucian collectivists, therefore, the behaviours must be ‘appropriate’, and morality consists of the group expectations and whether implicit and explicit attitudes or behaviour are or are not consistent is unimportant for them (Ko, 2002). For example, Ohbuchi et al. (1999) showed that the primary concern of collectivists in conflict situations is to maintain harmonious relationships with others in their group (Triandis & Suh, 2002). In this sense, collectivists prefer to avoid or solve conflict in private for the sake of maintaining ‘face’ instead of confrontations (Triandis & Suh, 2002; Lu, 2011).
Chinese Political Ideology and Confucianism
As Potter points out that, “[t]he patrimonialism of Confucianized Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought combines with the sovereignty of party-state supremacy to establish a powerful modality of governance in the PRC” (Potter, 2004, p.196).
Ideology Void
Confucian hegemony had come under fierce attack during the period of Mao’s rule. The successful communist revolution in 1949 altered the structure of Chinese society by bringing in Marxism-Leninism and its metamorphosis to Maoism. The official form of this radical ideology was based on class struggle and the highly controlled monopoly of power, societal homogeneity, political mobilisation and anti-traditionalism. The most vivid representation of this frenetic ideological faith was exemplified by the chaotic years of the “Cultural Revolution” and the “Great Leap Forwards.” During these periods Confucianism was condemned as “a feudal aristocrat and a reactionary” (Kallio, 2011, p.47). Sadly, Confucian classical family values such as respect for the seniors, kinship networks and ancestor worship were catastrophically stripped and violated (Kallio, 2011). However, the destruction of tradition has not always companied with the rise of a new socio-cultural order. Before the new moral commitments were re-created, the traditional social fabric of harmonious Chinese society was torn apart by Maoism (Rarick, 2007). It has also been further assaulted by the practical implementation of the ‘open up’ the door to the West policies in the early 1980s. The importation of western technologies and investments has been accompanied, unfortunately, by hedonism, materialism, greed, self-indulgence, acquisitiveness and corruption. As a consequence, the Chinese system soon became ‘spiritual vacuum,’ because Communism could no longer serve as the foundation for values linked to moral and spiritual inspiration, as it did during Mao’s era. Traditional Chinese values were not yet recovered from the serious attack upon them during the years of chaos (Kallio, 2011). The Party-state launched a campaign of so-called ‘Traditional Culture Learning,’ promoting and reviving values entrenched deep in Confucian culture. The government did this to suit its present use, in the need of repairing the “chinks in their rusting spiritual-logical armor” (Kallio, 2011, p.3).
Control Mechanisms
Despite extended economic freedom in China in the last three decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never loosened the control on its people (Shenkar, 1996; Lin & Clair, 2007). After four decades of relentless propaganda and separation from the outside world, the “omnipresent and omnipotent communist party-state has indeed made deep imprints on Chinese people, regardless of whether they are young or old, rural or urban, educated or illiterate” (Goodwin, 2011, p.266). Party apparatus has normally been blended in with the different State administration levels from central government, provincial and municipal, down to county, township, and village. China is a unitary state, where regional governments are legislatively and administratively bound to take orders from higher level governments. Indeed, all different levels of governmental agencies need to be consistent with the central Government in terms of institutional arrangement (Li, 2011). Party branches are omnipresent at all administration levels, and Party members have held almost all major government positions, such as police, and military positions at every administration level (ibid).
So, Mao’s “Four Collectivist Articles of Discipline” still apply today as a guiding orientation for both the Party and the entire nation, namely:
1. The individual is subordinate to the organization;
2. The minority is subordinate to the majority;
3. The lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and
4. The entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee.
All the personnel, media outlets (newspapers, magazines and books, radio and television stations, and internet) and the security apparatus are controlled by the state. This being so, state censorship towards the media is still considered necessary. The Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee is in charge of ideologically-related work and controls the whole of the nation’s mass media, publishing houses, and all other means of education through licensing media outlets, giving instructions to media. Regarded as another government agency, they have local branches which correspondingly control the local area with respect to relevant matters related to community integrity. The bad news was constrained so as not to over-power a certain proportion of the news, except if they are news items from aboard, such as riot in the middle-east, typhoon in the United States, and bush fire in Australia etc. The “Unity of thinking” is a popular phrase of logical control heard or seen often in state Medias. Certain ‘delicate’ subjects such as Tibet and Taiwan have raised issues etc., including the resettlement polities associated with the Three Gorges Dam all of which have become too sensitive to be discussed in public.
Although the regime of communist state policy exercises close control over Chinese society, fewer Chinese are able to identify or even experience such control (Nathan & Shi, 1993). There are two possible reasons that might contribute to this paradoxical phenomenon. First, the communist regime manages to make its omnipresent control over the everyday lives overlooked by its subjects. For example, powerful party organs such as the Organization and Propaganda Departments are located in unmarked buildings and their phone numbers are not listed to the public (Brady, 2008). Their structure and organization is ‘extremely secretive’. This strategically low profile has been kept to ensure that their daily operations are out of public view (ibid). Second, some citizens, especially intellectuals and the well-educated, ignore deliberately the regime’s control as a way out of the state of psychological tension and frustration that it induces. Third, majority Chinese are simply accustomed to the political control for so long that they do not recognized it as ‘control’. In this sense, a relatively low sense of the government’s impact and tolerance serve to allow the Chinese regime to enjoy a “safety cushion” of general underestimation of its power and control (Nathan & Shi, 1993).
Unity of Ideological Thinking
Ideological propaganda was more influential, and in turn impacted more among the less-educated population, and in less economically developed regions (Lin & Clair, 2007). Ordinary people are unmotivated to take an interest in the party’s internal operations and may favor the suppression and repression of ideas that they are against (Nathan & Shi, 1993). The views which explicitly expressed by young people these days reflect their indifference and ignorance on what the party actually does nowadays.
In recent years as I intimated earlier, the Communist Party has begun promoting traditional learning which contains references to important Confucian collective values as harmony and stability, filiality, loyalty, and unity. These values helped to shape a managerial and controllable mindset emphasizing on Confucian collectivism, and harmony over conflict, while selfishness was condemned as an evil, self-sacrifice was praised as the highest level of moral duty and virtue (Wang, 2011). These ideas came to constitute the foundation of modern patriotism and nationalism in China. In particular, ‘harmony’, which is regarded as the highest good in Confucianism has played a central role in today’s political mantra, when increasing domestic riots are gaining more and more attention in and outside China through internet access, though even the internet has been censored by filtering key words such as “June-fourth incident” and Tibet. (Kallio, 2011). The CCP has consistently inculcated Chinese people to with a desire “contribute to society” (Tsui et al., 2004). Indeed, it is taught by Confucius that virtuous men “will not seek to live at the expense of injuring their virtue (Ren). They will even sacrifice their lives to preserve their virtue (Ren) complete” (Analects, Ch.15:8, trans. Legge). Slogans propagandized by the central government and spread by the states-owned mass medias, can be seen all over China, but particularly in places around the reservoir regions, where it was seen as important that oustees should be greatly admired and inspired by the so-called “Spirit of Three Gorges Migrants”. There was in fact an exhibition praising this “Spirit of Three Gorges Migrants” which was held in Beijing and other regions in order to promote the collectivist spirit of self-sacrifice for the common good (Wang, 2011).
Cadre System
The CCP’s more than 80 million membership is a key instrument of Communist Party control. It accounts for 6 percent of the Chinese population, making it the biggest political party in the world (Chan, 2004). Party branches are present at each state administration level (central, provincial, municipal, county, township, village) and Party membership has traditionally been made up largely of State officials (for example, Majors are also Deputy Party Secretary) (Pye, 1995). Under such an authoritarian political system, the selection of Party cadres is still achieved primarily through direct appointment by officials in a higher hierarchy instead of by election. Those who are potentially selected must have exhibited their “loyalty to the Party, to the country and to the Chinese population,” which represents thethree main selection criteriafor the cadres (ibid). In this context, local officials selected in this way are only required to answer to their higher authorities, because their work performance is assessed by those higher authorities, and their promotions primarily depend on the higher authorities’ decision, which makes the sovereignty of the party-state conditional upon the power of the personal bonding achieved by its members (Pye, 1995; Sun et al., 2005). Consequently, the checks and balances in such political system are practically non-existent (Sun et al., 2005).
The cadre selection and political centralisation system make the counter forces such as the interest in creating an independent media, autonomous trade unions, independent non-government organisations, and independent judicial system, are either weak or virtually absent. The concepts of supremacy of Constitution and the rule of law are still the ‘lip service’ paid by governmental officials. Rule by law only is generally used by the State as an instrument for social control. As a result, corruption is rampant at all levels of institutional management, especially amongst power-hungry and self-serving Party cadres (Pye, 1995; Sun et al., 2005; Wang, 2005).
Pervasive Influence of Confucian Values on Chinese Leadership
Confucianism and Legalism
Confucianism and Legalism are two philosophies which have been used by Chinese leaders to their putative advantage throughout China’s long history. In Confucianism, socio-cultural harmony is allegedly achieved through authoritarian filial submission characterized by the behavioral principles contained in the Five Virtues. By contrast, the Legalists insist that the harmonious society can only be achieved with the imposition of a stiff and severe punishment in the context of domestic rule, thereby enforcing state power and strict regulations based on behavioral control, rather than moral conscience. Legalism is known for its preference for imposing severe and excessive punishments on people who fail to comply with their duties imposed by the State. The First Emperor of the Qin dynasty (221-207 BC) who first unified China, for example, so fervently favored Legalism that his policies almost annihilated both Confucianism and Confucians during the Qin’s government. The Qin rulers criticized the ‘softy’ Confucians and rigorously rejected the Confucian appeal to moral considerations in the conduct of government (Kallio, 2011). Legalism’s brief, but ruthless expression in the short-lived Qin Dynasty, however, left a lasting mark on Chinese ruling culture, inasmuch those who ruled realized that reasonable rewards and server punishments could actually serve to facilitate political control and in turn establish a quite effective level of social harmony (Keating, 2004; Kallio, 2011).
It is clear that Legalism did help to shape the extent to which Confucianism influenced political leadership practices in China. Other major philosophies in traditional Chinese culture such as Taoism and Buddhism may have exerted their influence upon certain rulers and the people over whom they had sovereignty, but these alternative philosophies have never gained the dominate position on political thought enjoyed by Confucianism (Keating, 2004). Ironically, Confucianism’s hierarchy and commitment to filial submission as a worldview would inadvertently prove to be a support by way of justifying the Legalist position (ibid). Four out of the five relationships I described previously are all characterized as superior and subordinate role relationships which depend on a hierarchical ranking of authority. Confucius emphasizes that the achievement of harmonious relationships relies on the order/position of those involved such that they are all aware of and actually execute their specific roles, no matter how deferent. Once a power is established, the chronology of authority must be maintained. For instance, the harsh Qin criminal codes have been followed by subsequent unified dynasties which emphasized aspects of Confucianism that placed it closer to modern practices of authoritarian control monitored through the practice of surveillance and punitive castigation of all kinds (Hui, 2008). Surveillance and castigation in the Legalist theory, provided a basis for exercising the power with ultimate efficiency. This legal absolutism, combined with the elements of moral absolutism promoted by Confucianism, afforded substantive conceptual and practical basis which the expression of autocracy could be propagated (Hsiao, 1959).
This being so, Confucianism and Legalism can be regarded as a unitary ‘coexisting nemesis’, for both in tension and in accord with each other in different situations. They have existed with unequal influence and often in conflict throughout Chinese history (Wang, 2005). Confucianism was promoted initially by Emperor Wu of Han dynasty (206 BC~8 AD) and then followed by all subsequent dynasties to feature as the dominant ‘State Orthodoxy’ permeating virtually every aspect of mundane socio-cultural tradition. Many Chinese scholars and general publics mistakenly regarded Confucianism as the single dominant tradition in China, without discerning that the impact of Confucianism cannot be understood independently of its complicity with Legalism (Hsiao, 1959; Hui, 2008). In practice, the tradition of codification initiated and advocated in Qin dynasty has not disappeared with the acceptance of Confucianism as The State ideology (Hsiao, 1959). Imperial Confucianism in fact deviated largely from the classical version, and Chinese rulers ingeniously acted practically on what the Chinese scholar Hsiao Kung-chuan phrased “Legalism with a Confucian façade” (Hsiao, 1959, p.117). Tung Jong-shu (179-104BCE) from the Han dynasty proposed such idea of “making judicial sentence by the Confucian classic of Spring and Autumn” and suggest “utilizing Legalism as an instrument to consolidate the Confucian social system” (Hwang, 2008, p.139). Governments of many generations in Chinese history have found it more convenient to motivate the masses by playing on fears and by utilizing propagandic and paradigmatic perceptions of authoritarian rule. This manipulation of Confucianism by political and cultural elites who once opposed it can actually be reinterpreted as a political tool to justify their own position of power and control. This being so, Legalist strategies were promoted in practice to enforce Chinese Rulers’ power and control over the masses. This being so, while Confucian doctrine would, either implicitly or explicitly come to be retained as the ideal educative pedagogy to discipline people to self-sacrifice for the good of the group, community, or nation (Hwang, 2008).
Leadership Practices
Leadership practices in China are still strongly influenced by Confucianism, impregnated with Legalist disposition and featuring a strong central authority for exercising power through the omnipresent State apparatus and strategies of mass political mobilization, and social cohesion by way of compliance and submission (Tsui et al., 2004; Chen & Zhong, 2005; Cheung & Chan, 2005; Sun et al., 2005; Javidan et al., 2006; Hwang, 2008; Lin, 2008; Gallo, 2011; Zhu, 2013). This being so, the ‘Party-State’ has preserved a strong influence on most aspects of civil life in Chinese society and is able to bring society to “bear upon policy formulation and implementation” (Tsang, 2000, p.3). Chinese leaders’ love of power and control and their paternalistic and hierarchical style of leadership management practises can largely be attributed to the permeation of Confucianism (with legalism facade) into civil society (Rarick, 2007). Leadership management (and human relationships in Chinese society) are for the most part regulated by addressing the implications of these hierarchical relations of ‘Wu Lu’ (five relationships). As we observed in the previous section, at least four of the five ‘Wu Lun’ relationships fall into leader-follower and command-submission didactic: ruler/the ruled, father/son, husband/wife, and older/younger brothers. As we have observed above, the punitive strategies of the Legalists provided the basis for China’s centralized administrative structure and policy decisions (Hsiao, 1959; Hui, 2008). Thus, it is not surprising that in many cases, as with the TGDP, decisions are made by one significant individual, or a small cadre of the top echelon, independently of the collectivistic mode of decision making characteristic of Chinese organizations (Fukuyama, 1995; Redding & Wong, 1986; Lin, 2008). Legalist permutation of Confucianism provides an authoritarian basis for hegemonic rule (Chen & Chung, 2005; Javidan et al., 2006). Open discussion, sharing information, or revealing reasons for decisions to subordinates are irrelevant, as is the necessity to canvass opinions from subordinates which could be reflected in a decision-making process. Such processes are not the norm and often tend to be seen as a sign of a leader’s incompetence and lack of authority (Javidan et al., 2006). Once this point is appreciated, it is easier to understand that top-down decision-making process and the authoritative implementing mode of project planning are not considered to be offensive morally and are in fact broadly accepted. Over fifty years of highly centralized governance through Communist doctrine, top-down central planning and authoritarian decision-making have been developed and fixed into rigid protocols, which systematically discourage subordinates to participate in individual decision making in an organisational setting (Ralston, 1995). In the case of participative decision making of the big projects such as Three Gorges Project, there has never been a full public hearing on the topic of environmental and social-justice impacts in its preconstruction stage. And the participation of resettlement negotiation with local displaced and resettled people is more an idle political ritual than a real thing, no matter how large the participatory population involved might be. Moreover, decision-making processes are normally secretive and confined within a small group of people, suggesting a large power distance between leaders and followers. This power distance is “not only reflected materialistically in office size, salary, and access to and use of organizational resources, but also in speech, dressing, calling for meetings, and other aspects of organizational life” (Chen, 1995; quoted in Lin, 2008, p.309). This tangible and intangible use of power leads the powerful to devalue the less powerful as being ‘incapable’ (Ralston et al., 1995), which in turn reinforces the necessity for compliance on the part of those who are ‘less powerful’. It should now be evident that this psychological exchange governing the leader-subordinate relationship is “a direct reflection of the Confucian family social structure which is based on filial piety” (Dorfman et al., 1997, p. 241). Thus, the decision of dislocation made by the powerful is based on the assumption of self-adaptation and self-adjustment by the displaced persons (most of whom are poor and powerless) to influence whatever the situations which might be in their moral interest (Fernandes, 2000).
One Chinese ruler who employed many classic Legalist techniques of this kind in governing was Mao Zedong. Mao’s leadership practice style has had a heavy influence on later Chinese leaders at all levels. As we observed in a previous section of this chapter that Mao’s Four Articles of Discipline require that the individual, the minority, the lower level and the entire membership of the Party must be subordinate to the organization, the majority, defined as the ‘higher level’ and the’ Central Committee’. Mao’s admiration for the “First Emperor” of the Qin dynasty, who clearly favoured the politics of Legalism, helps us to understand Mao’s ruthless, and manipulative leadership skills, during the period of his ruling from 1949 until his death in 1976. Admiration for the harsh ruling system of Legalism helped Mao ideologically justify his heavy reliance on coercive tactics and his monopoly power to transform Chinese society (Tsang, 2000). And similar to the ruthless ‘First Emperor’ 2000 years ago who burned the books of Confucius, and buried the Confucius scholars alive, Mao was caught surprised that Chinese intellectuals did not restrain their criticisms of the Party and its policies in 1957, during the ‘Hundred Flowers Campaign’ initiated by Mao himself (ibid). As a result, the Hundred Flowers Campaign was suddenly stopped and the “Anti-Rightists Campaign” (1957-1959) was promptly instigated by Chairman Mao in which the colleges were closed and as many as 550,000 Chinese, most of them intellectuals, were labeled ‘rightists’ (enemies of the people) and persecuted (ibid). Those who protested and even those who did not, but were simply teachers were sent to the countryside in order to experience the life of the poor during the Cultural Revolution (ibid). Much of this history was well presented in one of Mao’s poems where he wrote in 1973:
I urge you to scold Emperor Qin Shihuang less,
His burning of books and burying of scholars, we should reassess.
Our ancestral dragon, though dead, lives on in our minds,
Confucianism, though renowned, is really worthless.
Qin’s political model has been practiced through all time . . . . (quoted in Hui, 2008, p.12 )
Pervasive Influence of Confucian Values on Obedience
I have argued that Chinese culture puts a lot of value on hierarchical deference and obedience. For at least a thousand years, people had been taught that the secret to social harmony lies in submission (Ko, 2002). These values grow out of Confucianism and explain, as I suggested earlier, why the Chinese seem more willing to follow their leaders, whether be they officials, bosses or simply elders, even when issues of social injustice would seem obvious to others. Originally, however, according to the idea of righteousness (Yi), persons who hold the roles of the ruler, the father, the husband, the senior and superiors should make decisions following the principles of benevolence, kindness, affability, and righteousness, while for those who hold the roles of the ruled, sons, the wife, and juniors are expected to exhibit loyalty, submission, diligence, faithfulness, conformity, deference, and behaviours that enhance the former group’ face (Yeh, 2003; Lin, 2008; Hwang, 1987&2009). Therefore, the principles of filial piety based on the concept of righteousness have been wrongly politicized to serve the vested-interest purposes of the rulers, turning them from the “bi-directional conditional of ‘kind father, filial son’ to the uni-directional sacrificial sonship” (Goodwin, 2011, p.267). The submissive attitude of Chinese subjects has been confirmed by many cross-cultural researches (Yang, 1986&1995; Fukuyama, 1995; Ho, 1994; Chang & Chu, 2002; Chen & Zhong, 2005; Cheung & Chan, 2005; Dalton & Ong, 2005; Sun et al., 2005; Javidan et al., 2006; Yan & Sorenson, 2006; Rarick, 2007; Hwang, 2001&2008; Gallo, 2011; Zhu, 2013). They all showed that Chinese subjects inclined to be less autonomous and less aggressive, more conforming to authority, and susceptible to the influence of powerful figures (ibid). Critics have pointed out that the Chinese government has been strengthened by the manipulative deployment of Confucian values, especially their reference to the necessity to respect and show submission all of which were reinforced by the concepts of Five relationships, and the doctrine of the ‘Mean,’ which stipulated conflict avoidance and the preservation of a harmonious society, no matter the cost (Tsui et al., 2004).
According to Chu, regardless of the profound influence of modernization and globalization, the value change in Confucian societies, China in particular, has been lamentably slow (Chu et al., 2004). This insight would help to explain, what has to date not adequately been explained; namely that the epistemology of power is a political reiteration of the ideology of hegemonic rule, and that this is nowhere better reflected them in the case of the Three Gorges Dam (Yang, 1995).
Authority Worship and Authority Dependence
As mentioned above, Confucian ethics are imposed upon ordinary people inculcating the ‘principle of respecting one’s superiors’. This is what purportedly justifies the making of decisions by the ones who holds the elite position (Hong, 1978). Confucian’s principles of conduct for the two opposite roles between power relationships are asymmetrical. The behavioural specifications of the less powerful (the ruled, the son, the junior and the subordinate) are much more detailed than the behavioural restrictions for those who are powerful (ibid). Consequently, the compilation of conceptual paradigms, values, beliefs, and norms explicitly and implicitly endorsed by that culture are transposed into its legacy. We have already seen how and why one’s psychological states drawn from these hegemonic principles influence and circumscribe one’s behavior (Starkey, 2007). When confronting authorities, Chinese people often become totally obedient and dependent in terms of decision making. Another factor which contributes to the hierarchically lower level subject’s self-surrendering or submissive attitudes is the awareness and fear of being under surveillance and liable to suffer serious punitive castigation (Hsiao, 1959). This being so, the pressure to comply with the wishes of their powerful sovereign, even though the outcome is in conflict with the subordinate’s personal goal is understandably likely (Hsiao, 1959; Hong, 1978; Hwang, 2008). Thus, the top-down form of power positions between the ruler and his subjects are firmly established and Power Distance between the superior and the inferior person is ideologically politicized (Hsiao, 1959). China has a Power Distance Index (PDI) ranking of 80, while the world average is 55 (Littrell, 2005). A high PDI indicates a high level of inequality of societal power (ibid). In this sense, the societal inequality is endorsed by the subordinates as much as by the rulers. Social harmony could be preserved if ordinary folks recognized the Chinese leaders’ superiority by showing their submission to them. Knowing that if they do not “thinly masked coercion/pacification campaigns could follow if they refused to submit” (Hui, 2008, p.9).
The innately unequal distribution of cultural capital is the cause of social inequality. According to Gaventa (1980), the survival of the regime of an unequal society depends on the subaltern classes internalizing the upper class’s ideology which defines the dominant value system. In Chinese society, communitarian values and the beliefs of the priority of collective goals over individual interests are internalized by the subaltern groups (Fernandes, 2000). This particular psychological dependence on authority is explained by Lucian Pye (1968) in an engaging exploration of Chinese political culture. The Chinese have a “compulsive need to avoid disorder and confusion, to seek predictability and the comforts of dependency, and to accept the importance of authority,” Pye went further, to say that this makes, “them anxious to seek out any acceptable basis for orderly human relationships” (1968, p.174). Therefore it is not incomprehensible that most Chinese tacitly agree that the State has the right to intervene in the operation of civil society in order to maintain social order and stability (Chang & Chu, 2002). In this way the omnipotent ‘Party-State’ is permitted to adjust its citizens’ consciousness and value to the Party lines. It is not surprising that the Party would have an interest in the continual demand for tokens of allegiance. Filial respect towards parents and loyalty to the Emperor are skillfully manipulated to be replaced by loyalty to the people, the Party and the nation. Thus, the Party-State exists for itself and demands the willingness of Chinese to sacrifice for the so-called collective good when time is up (ibid).
Keep People Unacknowledged
Only then can he obliterate the path of virtue, muzzle the mouths of fast eloquence, curb the deeds of high-spirited men, keep the empire in ignorance, and exercise his faculties of seeing and hearing by himself alone…(Legalist Han Feizi, quoted in Hsiao, 1959, p.109)
It is salutary to recognise that Confucius, as well as the famous Legalist advocator Han Feizi (c.280-233 BC), both assumed that the common populace lacked sufficient intelligence to make decisions for themselves without the guidance of their rulers. As Confucius put it, “the people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it” (Confucius, The Analects, Ch.5). Thus, those in more elite positions of power associate poverty with low intellectual ability, in turn generalizing demographic factors to function as socio-cultural indicators of success potential. This bizarre form of accusation is frequently used to justify devaluation against those who are in fact victimized. The paradox is that the limited access the poor have to education creates a ‘catch 22’ by way of a twin process of alienation for those few who survive until the end. In essence they tend to end up in a situation of dilemma: rejecting their own group as inferior, while not being accepted by the dominant society as equals (Fernandes, 2000).
The demographic composition of people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam is almost half from the poorer sections of society and the majority of them is less educated and is kept ignorant of relevant resettlement information concerning which compensation package it is suggested they deserve to be provided. Given the inequitable nature of the power relations between the powerful project authorities and the project affected population, the latter are those who are excluded from direct and indirect control over the exercise of ‘State Power’ and therefore are inevitably excluded from decision-making (Kibreab, 2000). First, such people are not even aware of the occurrence of injustice, let alone encouraged to stand up against it. Second, even if they are well aware of their due rights, fear of confronting the local governments and its punitive measures often make them repress their deeper ‘moral’ or psychological tendencies to right wrongs, let alone to forego any desire to seek social-economic-political justice, in relation to the inhumane demands imposed upon them. Even if some of them do endeavor to protest, they are unable to make their voices heard and thus have no political power to impose the adoption of better policies, given their powerlessness status quo (Cernea, 1993&2008).
Confucianism, Aggressive Behaviours and Suppression
Chinese social and family life is set, fundamentally, to maintain the harmonious order and integrity of the in-group. Any challenge to authority or family seniors is regarded as the potential causes which lead to disorder. Besides, the uniquely omnipotent China’s security apparatus is fully capable of ensuring the suppression any major internal disturbances (Stein, 1998). The use of aggressive behavior to challenge authorities is cracked down from an early age. Research has indicated that a substantial section of the Chinese community has developed and formed a pattern of deferent behavior which reflects the view that it is better to be “a dog (living on master’s patronage) who can at least enjoy the peace dealt to a person in troubled times”, as one Chinese proverb puts the issue (Bond & Wang, 1981). Chinese society has therefore been profoundly conservative. Chinese people have historically displayed an attitude of endurance in confronting political repression and arbitrariness (Solomon & Robinson, 1973).
That being said, however, this kind of obedience only goes so far. If those in power do not acknowledge their own moral incongruity, an thus keep on imposing their will over the less powerful, the latter may find the loss of their autonomy to be intolerable, even for traditional Chinese. It is true that a limited measure of criticismis accepted in China today, as long as it keeps a local focus and does not last long. Wide-range critiques and protests are often seen by the Party leadership as constituting ‘collective defiance’ against the state and thus a challenge to the leadership of the Party (Zhou, 1993). When this happens, the behavior of these who protest will not be tolerated and the likelihood that the protestor will end up being harshly punished is extremely high, especially when dealing with the subjects well-placed enough to attract wide attention within and out of China (ibid). The massive uprooting of 1.3 million people and its highly disruptive aftermaths cannot be neglected. Dislocation and resettlement in TGDP have tragically destroyed many people’s lives. Some have responded in protest. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there were in fact dozens of small size ‘collective movements’ initiated by local displaced farmers. They were all put down through either imprisonment of their leaders who initiated the collective actions or the police were called out to disperse the crowd, with whatever degree of violent suppression was required.
Urban citizens made up half of the displaced population associated with the TGDP. China’s urban middle class are regarded more or less like Chinese intellectuals. In a fast developing society, mass media, and a popular culture which has indoctrinated urban professionals who seek material opportunities, and a new way of life, with middle-class status, instead of working towards a revolution which could be life-threatening. They may wish for more political freedom, but, they do not dare to rise up en masse against the powerful State because although they have little, the little they have is still too much to lose. Some would argue that decades of economic reform do bring more material benefits to the urban population than to that of rural farmers. That could explain why the most unrest in recent years has been initiated in rural areas.
Household Registration System, Work Units and Property Rights
The Chinese Household Register System (hukou) (HRS) and the work Unit (danwei) are two key features of life in the People’s Republic. In order to limit the migration of rural workers and to control population mobility, resource distribution such as housing, employment, health care, education and a rationing system governing the supply of daily necessities, is executed as a way of monitoring targeted groups of people. State policy declared an end to free migration in the 1950s, with the establishment of the HRS to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas (China’s Household Registration System, 2005; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Individuals are categorized as an ‘urban’ worker, or as a ‘farmer’, based on their place of residence and eligibility for certain socioeconomic benefits such as housing, health care, child care and education. These benefits have become less pertinent in recent years, due to the economic reforms (McDonald-Wilmsen, 2009). Under this system, a permanent residence booklet is issued by local police agencies which show the ‘agricultural’ or ‘non-agricultural’ resident’s status (China’s Household Registration System, 2005; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Children invariably inherit their household register status from their parents. In most cases, both parents have same household register status. If not, children will follow the suit of the mother’s status, whether or not she is defined as having a ‘non-agricultural’ or ‘agriculture’ status. The reason for this is that there were more cases in which a ‘non-agricultural’ male marries an ‘agricultural’ female than vice-versa, which effectively restraints more people from getting the benefit, by reason of being a ‘non-agricultural’ citizen.
China’s HRS has imposed strict controls on internal migration of ordinary Chinese citizens. It was difficult for ordinary people to move to another city unless they can show that he/she is admitted to a work unit in that city. It was almost impossible for a rural resident to become an urban householder, unless he/she managed to at least get a college degree. These limits effectively blocked most rural residents from moving to urban area (ibid). For that reason there exists a “resident discrimination”, such that urban residents often have a strong sense of superiority over residents from rural areas. Work Units and HRS are invisible walls to divide people into different categories of socio-economic status (Gong, 1989; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). In the context of the TGDP case, compensation was calculated on the resettler’s Household Register status, as I illustrated in the previous chapter. Normally, urban resident holders received more compensation than did agricultural household registers. Some rural oustees were allowed to have their Household Register status altered to urban status, which is considered another way of compensation due to the big gap between urban haves and migrant have-nots (McDonald-Wilmsen, 2009).
The possibility of changing the strict household register system has been in process since the beginning of the 1980s, with the increasing demand on surplus of rural labor in urban areas. National and local authorities in recent years loosened the restrictions on obtaining urban residence status. Even so, reform efforts face considerable practical obstacles. Central government regulations assure the loyalty of China’s urban population by still linking some socioeconomic benefits with ‘hukou’ registration, thereby maintaining a firm grip on society (China’s Household Registration System, 2005; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). Given these conditions, it is still difficult and complicated to have one’s household register status altered. Alternatively, millions of rural Chinese migrants migrated to urban areas without any formal registration. As I described above, the compensation for displaced people in TGDP area was based on the household register status, and those people drawn from the ‘floating population’, as they are identified officially, quite often get lesser compensation than their counterparts, if they were lucky. For some who were unlucky, they got none. Given that increasingly more privately-owned, or foreign invested enterprises, also served to reduce the significant influence that the conventional work units used to have imposed on the society with the abandonment of rationing. Despite these reforms, both unregistered migrants and those holding temporary residence permits faced severe restrictions on public services such as subsidized health care, or education for their children on an equal basis with established urban residents. For example, both national and local regulations impose additional educational fees as levy on migrant children based on their household register status, from several hundred Yuan to several thousand Yuan per year, which accounts for a significant fraction of an average income for a migrant family (China’s Household Registration System, 2005).
The non-agricultural residence holder is closely linked to the work units. A work unit is the department, school, or factory, which employs a person. To assure the economic livelihood, hierarchical control and political loyalty of China’s urbanian workers, the State used to (maybe still does) provide those workers with guaranteed employment opportunities. Relatively egalitarian rewards and lifelong benefits designed to accommodate everything from salary and pensions, subsidized housing, and free education to health care, recreation, and family planning before 2000 was provided (China’s Household Registration System, 2005; Chan & Buckingham, 2008). The process even reviews marriage and divorce applications before the 1990s (Gong, 1989). Even today, the work unit still serves as an indicator to define a person’s place in society. Working for this old, intricate cradle-to-grave system of state workplaces in that period is like a marriage. It is very hard to leave even if they are unhappy with it, because it is difficult to find a new one without permission from their original unit. This intensively organizational interference in a citizen’s private lives in Chinese society is a liability in building a modern economy. Thus, the Party has gradually removed itself by the late 1980s from the personal lives of its citizens, and the process comes along with the dismantling of most welfare strategies previously mentioned. Although being stripped off mundane obligations by the reformed state policies, the work units, including SOEs, the local collective-owned enterprises and private enterprises (though the latter two are not administratively under the control of the State) are nonetheless subject to direct state intervention (Zhou, 1993).
A Traditionally Weak Civic Accountability and Legal System
“Lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties and the people will try to keep out of jail but will have no sense of shame. Lead the people by virtue and restrain them by the rules of decorum, and the people will have a sense of shame and moreover, will become good.” (Confucius, quoted in Littrell, 2005, p.3)
“Political pluralism, and administrative transparency and professionalism are hallmarks of civic accountability” (Tanzi, 1998, quoted in Snell & Tseng, 2002, p.450). The ‘One-Party’ rule in the Chinese mainland, the lack of supremacy of laws, the rampant use of Guanxi(social network), and the traditional justice solution within the clan or guild indicate a weak civic accountability in authoritarian regimes like China, where the structure of democracy and civil society are not established or weak (McCully, 2001). The above attributed factors have their roots in Confucianism (Littrell, 2005). Confucianism promoted the code of paternalistic conducts in which the State can take the liberty of making decisions on behalf of the people (Baharvar, 2007). This decision affected the legal development and codification of law in China in a range of profound and yet basic ways. The emphasis placed on the position within the hierarchy, while promoting the propriety by Confucius, have pragmatically provided a measure of protection to the people on the top of the power chain who may have stood against the rule of law (Kallio, 2011). A frequently quoted Confucius’ saying goes like this: “Li [propriety/rituals]is not applied to the populace; penalty is not applied to the senior officials” (Book of Rite, Quli Ӏ:68, quoted in Gong, 1989, p.371). Confucius’ writings emphasize a preference for ‘rule by man/virtue’, rather than ‘rule of law’. In this sense, Confucius’ values contribute to the forming of a weak civil society and a strong Party-State (Littrell, 2005). The construction of TGDP and its involuntary resettlement reflect the lack of individual rights to balance the commitment to collective interests. Though Chinese property law has existed in various forms for centuries, the first formal Property Law of PRC was enacted in 2007 (Bezlova, 2007). Enforcement of private property rights has been compromised by ‘local protectionism’ and corruption under China’s current regime. The Chinese government still appears largely ingrained in the communist rhetoric, with the phrase of ‘Public Interest’ or ‘Eminent Domain’ to reclaim the land under such consideration. The current law, however, either in the constitution or any subsidiary legislation, lacks the necessary requirements of procedural due process to protect those who have been displaced (ibid). Practically speaking, and since the Party-State of China controls all legislative bodies, little help is available (Wang, 2011).
[1] Also, it is important to point out that culture is not the only factor influencing human behaviour.
[2] Neo-Confucianism has evolved from the synthesis of Confucianism, Taoist cosmology and Buddhist spirituality and has developed into two schools. However, it is li xue (I6 – the School of Principles/Laws), initiated by Cheng Yi (1033-1108) and developed by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) of the Song Dynasty (960–1279), that has “remained the most influential single system of philosophy until the introduction of Western philosophy in China in recent decades” (Fung, 1948, p.294; Leng, 2005)